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INTRODUCTION
When anthropologist Henry Sumner Maine issued his famous
proclamation that modern legal development evolved "from Status to
Contract,"' he used juridical categories to make a statement about
progress. Voluntary relations now build the law, Maine declared. The
alternative to voluntary relations - identity-based legal labels to de-
cree what people may and may not do - must relocate to the dustbin
of history. Only a backwater society would keep them.
American legal change in the century-plus since Maine's death in
1888 gives credence to the claim that status inexorably yields to con-
tract. At one level, newer developments refute the Maine thesis.
"Stalkers," "telemarketers," "date rapists," "reciprocal beneficiaries,"
"surrogate mothers," and other noun-phrases have joined the roster of
what the law recognizes as shorthand for duties, entitlements, and li-
ability.2 Labels continue to emerge; rights and obligations attached to
them flourish. Meanwhile older status roles like "tenant," "landlord,"
and "employer" have acquired more legal force, rather than less, in
the last dozen decades.3
Good reasons support the use of status as an instrument for law-
making and law enforcement: whether ancient or newly coined, status
labels today tell individuals what the law permits and forbids. They
pack meanings into a word or two. The phrase "dependent child," for
instance, makes it clear that somebody - at least one person - can be
prosecuted for not coming up with food and shelter. Designations like
"owner," "felon," "attorney of record," or "residual legatee" are
worth fighting over in court. Law would be verbose if not incoherent
1. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY
HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 165 (Ashley Montagu ed.,
Univ. of Ariz. Press 1986) (1864).
2. See Cook v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 847 F. Supp. 725, 730 (D. Minn. 1994) (referring
to a " 'date' rapist"); Doe v. Keane, 658 F. Supp. 216, 221-22 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (analyzing
the status of "surrogate mothers"); Guth v. Freeland, 28 P.3d 982, 995 n.6 (Haw. 2001) (re-
ferring to "reciprocal beneficiaries"); R.R. v. M.H., 689 N.E.2d 790, 791 (Mass. 1998) (noting
"surrogate parent[s]"); State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 72 (Minn. 1996) (defining "stalker");
Charvat v. Dispatch Consumer Serv., 769 N.E.2d 829, 830-31 (Ohio 2002) (describing
"telemarketer" regulations).
3. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Postmodern Family Law: Toward a New Model of Status, in
PROMISES TO KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA 157, 167 (David
Popenoe et al. eds., 1996).
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without the swift, compact punch of a legal label. If status is holding
strong in the law, one need not wonder why any label-category is still
with us. All statuses might be burgeoning.
"From Status to Contract," however, challenges the existence of
state-sponsored marriage. Maine's contention that Status is primitive
and Contract modern reminds us that marital status is critically differ-
ent from other legal statuses that have been thriving. Becoming a
"stalker" or a "surrogate mother" fits the Maine progression: it looks
like Contract rather than Status. The terms connote episodes or par-
cels of individual lives, rather than a comprehensive social identity. A
person can put on the label and take it off with little formality. By con-
trast the status of marriage - becoming, or ceasing to be, a wife or a
husband - spreads into the far comers of one's life. Marriage is dif-
ferent also from the other key status category of family law - parent-
hood - in that the relation between parent and child addresses a rela-
tively clear and uncontroverted need. Infants cannot survive without
resources from adults. A husband or wife can provide care to a
dependent spouse, but care for dependents is not a defining condition
of the marital relation,' as it is of parenthood. Marriage, in short, is a
peculiar status.' Most other legal statuses relate directly either to
episodes or transactions on the one hand ("agent," "mortgagee,"
"harasser") or dependency on the other ("parent," "guardian," per-
haps "fiduciary").6
Law does have a history of recognizing a couple of personal, or
comprehensive, statuses that do not fall into these two broad catego-
4. The common law doctrine of "necessaries" recognizes that a married person may be
liable to creditors for some purchases that a spouse makes. This doctrine does not, however,
mandate even financial support, let alone spousal caregiving. See D. KELLY WEISBERG &
SUSAN F. APPLETON, MODERN FAMILY LAW 262 (2d ed. 2002).
5. The marriage literature includes efforts to find a categorical label for this institution.
See MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACr TO COVENANT 13 (2000) (suggesting "cove-
nant" rather than status); LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT XiX (1981)
("[M]arriage has moved from a status to a status-contract .... [M]arital partners have lost
the traditional privileges of status and, at the same time, have been deprived of the freedom
that the contract provides.").
6. A key exception comes from business law, which offers "corporation" and "partner-
ship" among its statuses rooted in neither dependency nor transactions. See generally Martha
M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private Distinction, 36 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 83 (2001) (noting that business partnerships, corporations, and limited
liability companies "are similar to intimate relationships in that they have significant status
elements that complement their contractual character"). I discuss the business-law analogy
below. See infra Part IV.A.3. In conversation, Tony Dillof has suggested to me that the
criminal-law concept of conspiracy is a legal status unrelated to dependency; liability for
conspiracy, he notes, is so broad that it transcends episodes or transactions. Conversation
with Tony Dillof, Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University School of Law, in
Detroit, Mich. (Dec. 4, 2002). Marriage remains anomalous, however, because its status
effects impose constraints on individuals, whereas a conspiracy is severable from individual
conspirators.
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ries of transaction and dependency. Such statuses partake of tautology.
They are what they are; they must be because they have been. Legal
consequences follow to status-bearers without consent; only a rare
person who acquires a comprehensive status understands what it
means before the label is bestowed.7 These labels are hard to shed.
Principal examples of this kind of status are race - a legal category
still not extinguished - and coverture, the set of disabilities that used
to shackle most women. And then there are the categories that come
from binary gender, where each person is assigned one (and only one)
of two (and only two) legal statuses. The anti-individualistic, choice-
denying nature of these comprehensive statuses has clashed with pro-
gressive legal development.'
It is in the law of marriage that the legal categories of "man" and
"woman" retain their power. During the years when the government's
distinguishing a woman from a man accreted disapproval in numerous
legal realms - employment, military service, prisons, higher educa-
tion9 - a defense-of-marriage movement insisted on this distinction
and engraved it into federal and state statutory law. Marriage, in fed-
eral law and in most states, must consist of a dimorphous pair, "one
man and one woman." 10
7. Such legal labels are not easy even for specialist scholars to spell out. Race, for in-
stance, has no canonical definition in the law. Marriage has been defined as "some sort of
relationship between two individuals, of indeterminate duration, involving some kind of
sexual conduct, entailing vague mutual property and support obligations, a relationship
which may be formed by consent of both parties and dissolved at the will of either." 1
HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 2.1,
at 81 (2d ed. 1987); see also Barbara Stark, Marriage Proposals: From One-Size-Fits-All to
Postmodern Marriage Law, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1479, 1482-83 (2001) (noting that marrying
means plunging "blindly into legal relationships" that the parties "know little or nothing
about").
8. Consider mental deficiency, once a locus of comprehensive statuses that the law dic-
tated and enforced. See, e.g., Marvin v. Trout, 199 U.S. 212, 213 n.1 (1905) (noting duties of
"the guardian or trustee of a minor, insane person or idiot"); Thlocco v. Magnolia Petroleum
Co., 141 F.2d 934, 938 (5th Cir. 1944) (quoting an Oklahoma statute stating that "[p]ersons
of unsound mind within the meaning of this chapter are idiots, lunatics, and imbeciles");
Lynch v. Rosenthal, 396 S.W.2d 272, 275 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965) (explaining that "there are
three classifications of subnormal mentality, to-wit: moron, low moron, and idiot; [and]
plaintiff is a low moron"). Few lament the decline of these legal statuses. See infra notes 13-
16 and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532-33 (1996) ("Focusing on the
differential treatment or denial of opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court
must determine whether the proffered justification [for sex discrimination] is 'exceedingly
persuasive.' The burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State.");
Cohen v. Brown Univ., 101 F.3d 155, 175-76 (1st Cir. 1996) (rejecting a university's argument
that female students were participating in sports at a lower rate than male students because
they lacked interest in athletic opportunities); Women Prisoners of the Dist. of Columbia
Dep't of Corr. v. D.C., 899 F. Supp. 659, 671-72 (D.D.C. 1995) (holding that lesser educa-
tional and vocational opportunities for women inmates violate the Equal Protection Clause).
10. Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000); see also
infra Part II.B.4 (describing the state-level counterparts, or "baby DOMAs").
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Here, then, is the lineup of statuses for human beings in contempo-
rary American law. On one side are the comprehensive labels: race
and the successor to coverture, gender.11 On the other side are noun-
phrases tailored to respond either to dependency, or to something re-
sembling free choice in one's encounters. Where does marriage land?
In this Article, I argue that marriage imbues individuals with a com-
prehensive legal status. It is not transactional. Nor is it targeted to ad-
dress dependency, although it may aid a dependent person inciden-
tally. Like race and coverture, the social category of marriage occupies
space in the law, and not only in society. Also like race and coverture,
marital status functions to elevate some individuals, and subordinate
others, based on their membership in groups that they did not choose
to join.12
The condition of marriage in American law is noteworthy. Al-
though Maine-like reports of their death might be greatly exaggerated,
most comprehensive legal statuses are on their way to oblivion in the
United States. Race, once a category that signified either enslavement
or the privilege to enslave others, and later a marker of privileges ei-
ther withheld or bestowed, such as where one could gather in public,
or which schools one could attend, now exists almost nowhere in
American law beyond "affirmative action," itself on the wane. 3
American law used to speak of lunatics and idiots; the status label now
assigned to cover this ground, "disability," sees human variation in
briskly functional and specific terms. 4 According to the Supreme
11. These two statuses do not exhaust the "comprehensive" list - one might add relig-
ion, alienage, and sexual orientation as comprehensive categories that have legal effects.
These categories are, however, the most fundamental.
12. Married adults generally have made a choice to marry, and stay married; the phrase
"single by choice" implies that at least some adults opt not to marry. Nevertheless, the con-
sequences of marital status are not entirely chosen. Recipients of unchosen legal benefits and
detriments related to marriage include children, whose entitlements can vary based on the
marital status of their parents, see infra note 160; jilted partners and single-but-not-by-choice
adults, who want to choose marriage but have not been chosen in turn, see infra notes 202-
210 and accompanying text; and persons coerced into marrying. See Mountholly v.
Andover, 11 Vt. 226, 227-28 (Vt. 1839) (declaring a marriage void on the ground of coer-
cion); Brown v. Brown, 29 S.W.3d 491, 492 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (referring to an earlier
marriage of one of the parties that had been annulled on the ground of coercion).
13. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 342 (2003) (upholding race-conscious univer-
sity admissions with the hope "that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no
longer be necessary to further the interest approved today").
14. American disability law has not achieved full enlightenment. See RUTH O'BRIEN,
CRIPPLED JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF MODERN DISABILITY POLICY IN THE WORKPLACE
63-87 (2001) (faulting American disability law for its construct of a "whole man" ideal);
Aviam Soifer, The Disability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L.
REV. 1279, 1283-84 (2000) (contending that the Supreme Court treats the disabled with
disrespect). Nevertheless, progress in disability law has proceeded since the landmark
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (2000). As amended in 1974, this statute
explicitly rejects "archaic attitudes and laws" in its encouragement of integration into the
mainstream. S. REP. NO. 93-1297, at 50 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6373, 6400.
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Court, the government may not classify homosexually inclined persons
as categorically less entitled to benefits that they obtain by democratic
means.15 And "men" and "women" are rapidly exiting most of the law;
"persons" take their place. Except in the law of marriage.16
Should marriage, then, make an explicit transition from Status to
Contract? If it opted to maximize the prerogatives of contract, this
change would encourage the law to abandon its recognition of the sex-
ual, gender-dimorphous dyad. 7 All domestic relations between adult
individuals would be formed by issue-specific agreements.18 Family law
would survive in order to regulate the care of children, but two would
no longer become one in any legal sense. The law would intervene in a
couple's life just as it now uses the law of contracts, torts, crimes, and
property to moderate relations between any other adults.
This idea has been floated, but not developed. Of the writers who
have made proposals along these lines,19 Martha Fineman has offered
15. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-35 (1996). This Article uses "homosexually in-
clined" or "homosexually oriented," something of a mouthful, because terser terms ("gay,"
"queer," and the like) have connotations that are too precise to describe this broad category.
16. See generally ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE TRANSFORMATION OF INTIMACY 26-28,
111-57 (1992) (arguing that marriage is one of many declining institutions that used to con-
trol sexuality and reproduction, and that marriage now approaches a "pure relationship"
sustained only by the partners' individual wishes).
17. Now, how exactly would the state proceed to end legal recognition of this dyad? The
race, coverture, and mental-disability precedents provide an array of role models. State stat-
utes, the Emancipation Proclamation, and an accumulation of customary law contributed to
abolishing the legal category of "slave." Courts and legislatures invalidated the de jure seg-
regation that followed emancipation. The Married Women's Property Acts began the elimi-
nation of coverture. Desuetude and shifts in public attitudes loosened the hold of statuses
like "lunatic" and "idiot." I return to the mechanics of abolishing state-sponsored marriage
below. See infra notes 348-360 and accompanying text.
18. The question of what, after abolition, a court should do with a meta-agreement like
"We, A and B, consent to be bound together as if we were married, in the pre-abolition
sense of the term" complicates the abolition proposal a little. But not too much. One can
imagine a body of intimate-contract law evolving on this question, just as corporate law
evolved to recognize the open-ended nature of what a corporation may do. See Kent
Greenfield, Ultra Vires Lives! A Stakeholder Analysis of Corporate Illegality (With Notes on
How Corporate Law Could Reinforce International Law Norms), 87 VA. L. REV. 1279, 1302-
13 (2001) (cataloguing the "rise and fall" of ultra vires, the doctrine that a corporation's
powers are limited by its charter). Contract law has already pondered the enforceability of
paradoxical contracts that waive freedom of contract; at least at this hypothetical level,
Americans already live with the possibility of, for example, an agreement to live under
eighteenth-century coverture law. Moreover, the subject is familiar: courts today must
construe cohabitation contracts, antenuptial contracts, separation agreements, child custody
agreements, and other knotty bargains between intimate partners.
19. See, e.g., Dianne Post, Why Marriage Should Be Abolished, 18 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 283 (1997) (claiming that marriage is a disaster); Russell Smith, Marriage: Who Needs It
Anyway?, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), May 23, 2003, at R1 ("Maybe marriage is a legal cate-
gory we no longer need."); David Boaz, Privatize Marriage, SLATE, Apr. 25, 1997, at
http://slate.msn.com/id/2440 ("Make [marriage] a private contract between two individu-
als."). Abolish-marriage scholars are mostly female, notwithstanding prevalent suspicions
that 'Marxists' and their ilk, presumably including men, oppose the traditional family.
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the most sustained attack on state-sponsored marriage.2 An expert in
family law, Fineman focuses on what she sees as family law's true do-
main, the care and nurturing of dependents. Family law could evolve
to deny marriage while acknowledging relation-based dependency, she
21argues. 1 Whereas children come into the world inherently needy and
helpless, those who do caregiving work within the family have their
dependency - economic vulnerability, conflict between paid and un-
paid work, unequal bargaining power vis-A-vis their partners - im-
posed upon them: "Women are socially and culturally assigned de-
pendency. ' '22 Thus state-sponsored marriage, to Fineman, is not a cure
for the plight of dependent mothers. Marriage creates their plight.
If Fineman is right to call dependency the center of, and the reason
for, legal regulation of the family, and also right to call women's fa-
milial dependency on men a contingent and reparable condition and a
problem that marriage makes worse, then the best rationale for state-
sponsored marriage is that it lassoes parents to their children: being
married to one's fellow parent seems to strengthen the parental tie,
particularly for fathers.23 So long as alternative means of yoking par-
Friedrich Engels pioneered unsentimental economic analysis of the family, for example, but
did not call for the abolition of state-sponsored marriage. See JUNE CARBONE, FROM
PARTNERS TO PARENTS: THE SECOND REVOLUTION IN FAMILY LAW 55-57 (2000) (summa-
rizing Engels). Nietzsche wrote, "Modern marriage has lost its meaning - consequently one
abolishes it," FREDERICH NIETZSCHE, Twilight of the Idols, in THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE
544 (Walter Kaufmann trans. & ed., 1954), but did not say who abolishes it, how, or when.
Lesbian legal scholars have expressed deep skepticism about marriage. See Patricia A. Cain,
Imagine There's No Marriage, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 27 (1996); Paula L. Ettelbrick, Do-
mestic Partnership, Civil Unions, or Marriage: One Size Does Not Fit All, 64 ALB. L. REV.
905 (2001); Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Les-
bian Marriage Will Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA.
L. REV. 1535 (1993); see also Jennifer Jaff, Wedding Bell Blues: The Position of Unmarried
People in American Law, 30 ARIZ. L. REV. 207 (1988) (advocating the elimination of privi-
leges and advantages that derive from state-sponsored marriage).
20. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL
FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES 228 (1995) (contending that "we
should abolish marriage as a legal category and with it any privilege based on sexual affilia-
tion"); Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Lesbians and Gay Men Should Read Martha Fineman, 8 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 167, 176 (2000) ("Abolish marriage as a legal category for
everyone. Read Martha Fineman.").
21. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY
OF DEPENDENCY (2004).
22. Martha Albertson Fineman, Symposium Comments, Divorce and Feminist Legal
Theory, 82 GEO. L.J. 2521, 2522 (1994).
23. Researchers frequently study never-married and divorced fathers, and find them
absent from their children's lives, in comparison to married fathers. Michael E. Lamb, Plac-
ing Children's Interests First: Developmentally Appropriate Parenting Plans, 10 VA. J. SOC.
POL'Y & L. 98, 108 (2002) (noting that divorced fathers are often absent, while "never-
married fathers are more than twice as likely as divorced fathers to have no contact with
their children"); Barbara Stark, Guys and Dolls: Remedial Nurturing Skills in Post-Divorce
Practice, Feminist Theory, and Family Law Doctrine, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 293, 372 n.394
(1997) (summarizing studies finding that most divorced fathers "neither see nor support their
[Vol. 102:129
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ents to children are untried as potential substitutes for marriage, and
so long as a close relationship with parents contributes to the good of a
child, the premise that state-sponsored marriage benefits children will
retain some validity.24 But as a means to tie children to adults, mar-
riage is a crude, antiquated, at-most-second-best instrument. Offspring
do not need their progenitors' union to be sanctioned by law for them
to reap the benefits of a close link to their parents, now that relatively
simple recordkeeping and genetic technology can connect parents with
neonates and young children - the most significant set of dependents
in any society - and assign legal status to that connection. New legis-
lation accompanying abolition could greatly increase the legal conse-
quences of acquiring the status of parent. Freed from monitoring sex-
ual affiliations, family law could spend its energies looking out for
vulnerable people. Abolishing state-sponsored marriage would not
ignore, eliminate, or increase dependency: on the contrary, it would
force the law to recognize that dependents need care.25
Abolishing marriage might not roil the surface of domestic life in
practice. Without state-sponsored marriage, many households would
likely resemble the married-with-children construct that dominates
family life in the United States today.26 Two people - in most cases a
pair that sees itself, and is seen, as gender-dimorphous - would form
a durable relation grounded in mutual intimacy and love. They might
choose to mark their union with rites and ceremonies. They would
typically live together in one household and procreate. Each adult in
the pair would feel related to the other; both would feel related to
their offspring. Such households would include the legal statuses of
"parents" and "children." But the dyad that came together as an adult
children in a systematic way") (internal citation omitted). These findings are of limited value
in predicting what father-child ties would look like if marriage were abolished. Although
they support a conclusion that a formal, legal connection to a child's mother tends to
strengthen a father's relationship with his child, they do not establish that such a connection
is the best means of doing so, and do not take into account the costs of that connection.
24. I discuss problems with this premise below. See infra Part II.C.1 (noting the frequent
confusion of correlation with causation so that, for instance, marriage is associated with
beneficial effects in children when parental wealth probably deserves the credit); Part III.C.4
(exploring ways that state-sponsored marriage can be harmful to children). Consider also the
well-being that parents and children experience outside of marriage in Europe, where non-
marital childbearing and childrearing enjoy considerable support: children in the marriage-
focused United States are much more likely than children in western Europe (and also in
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand) to live in poverty. M.M. Slaughter, Fantasies: Single
Mothers and Welfare Reform, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 2156, 2164-65 (1995) (reviewing FINEMAN,
supra note 20).
25. See infra Part III.C.5 (arguing that the existence of marriage conceals caregiving
labor).
26. But see John T. Noonan, Jr., The Family and the Supreme Court, 23 CATH. U. L.
REV. 255, 270 (1973) ("Without marriage, created by law, acknowledged by law, privileged
by law, the family is a formless biological blob.").
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couple would share no legal bond, no singular identity vis-A-vis third
parties or the state.
Could it happen? Although no constituency in the United States
has mobilized against state-sponsored marriage,27 the coverture-
influenced fusion of two-into-one grows ever weaker in practice. Most
Americans give marriage a try sometime during their lives, but indi-
viduals have also been withdrawing from marriage - a phenomenon
expressed in a relatively high divorce rate and a rising average age
of first marriage.28 These demographic changes suggest a reduction in
the percentage of Americans who register with the state as half of a
couple.
Along with these changes, legislatures and courts have been re-
flecting and fostering a newer individualism in the law of marriage that
has undermined the old two-into-one status.29 Divorce law, liberalized
in the last few decades, has made unions easier and cheaper to escape.
In less than thirty years state governments swerved from almost
unanimously rejecting antenuptial contracts dividing marital property
to almost unanimously enforcing them." Even traditionalist reforms
that have appeared in recent years (such as the harder-to-exit "cove-
nant marriage" and premarital counseling imposed on applicants for
marriage licenses), which are designed to strengthen marriages, focus
more on the marrying individual as party to a contract and less on the
27. The future may bring change. One pro-marriage initiative surveyed young adults and
found that forty-five percent of them "agree that the government should not be involved in
licensing marriage." NATIONAL MARRIAGE PROJECT, THE STATE OF OUR UNIONS 2001, at
13 (2001), available at http://marriage.rutgers.edu/Publications/SOOU/NMPAR200l.pdf
(May 2001).
28. See ANDREW HACKER, MISMATCH: THE GROWING GULF BETWEEN WOMEN AND
MEN 7 (2003); Michael A. Fletcher, For Better or Worse, Marriage Hits a Low, WASH. POST,
July 2, 1999, at Al; see also Jeffrey Zaslow, Divorce Makes a Comeback, WALL ST. J., Jan.
14, 2003, at D1 (noting that recent pro-marriage government initiatives seemed to be failing
in 2003, as evidenced by a rising divorce rate).
29. One scholar of family law has named this phenomenon "privatization." Jana B.
Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1444. Commenting on a
draft of this Article, law student Damon Karam reflected on a broader theme, manifest in
contemporary American life:
We are seeing sporting events billed as 'Shaq vs. Yao Ming' or 'Sammy Sosa vs. Barry
Bonds' and their contracts reflect this shift towards individual focus. In the workplace, it
seems as if every person employed by a company has a 'title,' from the CEO to the janitor.
Whether right or wrong, it is the direction society has taken in virtually all facets, except
marriage.
Memorandum from Damon Karam to Anita Bernstein 2-3 (Feb. 27, 2003) (on file with the
author).
30. See Pendleton v. Fireman, 5 P.3d 839, 845-46 (Cal. 2000) (noting that forty-one juris-
dictions enforce such contracts, and relating this new stance to "changes in public policy and
the attitude toward marriage").
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oneness of union.31 A number of state governments in the United
States have decided to allow pairs of individuals to sign up for some of
the benefits of legal marriage without imposing on these pairs any de-
mand to be gender-dimorphous or have a sexual bond.12 This innova-
tion understands law-based coupling as a choice that two adults can
make, beyond mere compliance with an old imperative to build child-
producing households. Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution,
published by the American Law Institute in 2002 after more than a
decade of work, suggests that when longstanding relationships end, the
existence of formal law-based unions should count for nothing when
courts assign rights and duties to individuals who separate. In other
words, according to the Institute, the law for dissolving families should
regard marriage as no different from extended cohabitation.33 Ameri-
can reformers keep an eye outside the United States, where same-sex
couples have won full marriage rights, and look forward to a similar
American movement away from the gender script.34 At least in the
short term, Goodridge v. Department of Public Health,35 the 2003 deci-
sion holding that the state of Massachusetts must provide marriage to
same-sex couples, has begotten fragmentation and dissent rather than
extended a monolithic condition to cover more people.3 6 Marrying -
and its important correlatives, repudiating marriage and being fore-
closed from it - now yields much less homogeneity. Back in 1861
Henry Maine wrote that, starting "from a condition of society in which
all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of Family,
we seem to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order in
31. See Developments in the Law - The Law of Marriage and Family, 116 HARV. L.
REV. 1996, 2091 (2003) (noting strong contractual underpinnings of covenant marriage).
32. See William C. Duncan, Whither Marriage in the Law?, 15 REGENT U. L. REV. 119,
122-24 (2002-2003) (describing "domestic partnership" in California, "reciprocal beneficiar-
ies" in Hawaii, and "civil unions" in Vermont); Joe Crea, Calif. Law Would Grant Gays Most
Rights of Marriage, S. VOICE, June 13, 2003, at 21 (reporting legislative initiative in Califor-
nia that would extend domestic-partnership law to grant "nearly all the rights of marriage").
33. AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION § 6.05
(2002). But cf Mark Hansen, A Family Law Fight, A.B.A. J., June 2003, at 20, 23 (quoting
critics who deem the ALl Principles destructive of marriage).
34. See Laura Douglas-Brown, Belgium Becomes Second Country to Let Gays Marry, S.
VOICE, Feb. 14, 2003, at 11 (noting recognition of same-sex marriage in Belgium and the
Netherlands and increased status-protection for same-sex couples elsewhere in Europe, and
quoting American activist-lawyer Evan Wolfson: "It's clear that we are riding a wave
here... [but] the United States is lagging behind."); Clifford Krauss, Now Free to Marry,
Canada's Gays Say, "Do I?," N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2003, § 1, at 1 (reporting gay couples'
reactions to the availability of marriage in Canada).
35. 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
36. Cass R. Sunstein, Federal Appeal, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 22, 2003, at 21 (noting con-
troversies that accompany the Goodridge decision).
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which all of these relations arise from the free agreement of individu-
als."37 A century and a half later, his statement has become more true.
The proposal to abolish state-sponsored marriage, then, comes af-
ter at least portents, if not out-and-out precedent, elsewhere in Ameri-
can legal change. Additional support for the proposal comes more
generally from a focus on the individual as the locus reached, regu-
lated, and tutored by law. What happens to individuals is the measure
of law's ambition and legitimacy. And more than ever, married people
are individuals. In contrast to the common law of centuries past,
American husbands do not sue in tort for their wives' injuries. When
a wife commits the crime, she, not her husband, does the time.
Marriages now contain separate personal property, and permit con-
tracting between the spouses. The persistence of a comprehensive le-
gal status that conjoins individuals into pairs - when in so many re-
spects each person is a solitary creature in the law - calls for
evaluation. I undertake that evaluation in this Article.
My account of state-sponsored marriage in the United States be-
gins in Part I with a primer on how federal and state law currently rec-
ognize this status. This legal recognition is far from static, and the last
decade marked several pertinent changes in the law of marriage. The
next Part links this pattern of law reform with a broader marriage
movement. From their premise that marriage is both socially desirable
and in need of shoring up, activists have encouraged both federal and
state lawmakers to focus on marriage policy. These leaders have de-
ployed an influential "case for marriage," which I study in Part II, ex-
amining its arguments and its successes on the legal landscape.
The proposal to abolish state-sponsored marriage puts this "case"
in a fresh light. Activists promote marriage on the ground that it offers
favorable contrasts to the alternatives to being married: singleness and
nonmarital cohabitation. They link marriage with happier individual
lives, a sense of the future that makes people willing to invest in their
relationships, children who score higher on various indices, sexual con-
tentment, and longer life expectancy, among other "goods."38 With all
these goods lying there waiting to be claimed, partisans would pursue
without hesitation changes in the law that encourage and reward mar-
rying. But welfare disparities between the married and unmarried
could be eliminated more effectively. Under abolition, "singleness,"
"cohabitation," and "marriage" would lose their legal status, and in-
deed some of their meaning.
In this context much of the "case for marriage" evaporates, be-
cause to date the "case" has contrasted being married only to being
37. MAINE, supra note 1, at 163.
38. See, e.g., John Witte, Jr., The Goods and Goals of Marriage, 76 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1019, 1019-20 (2001).
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divorced and to never marrying; it has never confronted state-
sponsored marriage as an option that right-thinking people might re-
ject on the same quasi-utilitarian basis that now commends getting
married over not getting married. This lapse is forgivable: researchers
like to focus on that which can be counted rather than on a counterfac-
tual hypothesis (especially one they can deem unrealistic).39 Harder to
"imagine there's no marriage," as Patricia Cain has proposed.40 But
marriage partisans, having broached a cost-benefit defense of the insti-
tution, open the door to imagining just that. The federal government
alone - not to mention the dozens of state governments that follow
similar policies - spends or declines to collect billions of dollars each
year because of its recognition of marriage, as I detail in Part III. If
state-sponsored marriage yields net payoffs for society - going be-
yond married individuals and their children - then these investments
should certainly continue. If not, then they become questionable.
41 I
begin the bookkeeping.42
The detriments of state-sponsored marriage can be laid out in
three levels. At a primary level, as mentioned, the government directly
forgoes revenue in consequence of its recognition of marriage. At a
secondary level, the law's recognition of marriage mandates or facili-
tates behaviors that cause social losses. Such losses are more difficult
to quantify than the primary detriments, but are linked closely to legal
39. For instance, some demographers compare the earnings of married men with those
of single men, and infer that marriage is good because the former group earns more. See
Peter Cappelli et al., It Pays to Value Family: Work and Family Tradeoffs Reconsidered, 39
INDUS. REL. 175 (2000); Megan M. Sweeney, Two Decades of Family Change: The Shifting
Economic Foundations of Marriage, 67 AM. Soc. REV. 132 (2002). The same data would
support different normative conclusions, including a proposal to abolish marriage on the
ground that it is inegalitarian. Researchers nevertheless prefer the more "realistic" endorse-
ment of marriage as good - a recommendation that both individuals and policymakers can
heed.
40. Cain, supra note 19, at 27.
41. Cf. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Inevitability of Dependency and the Politics of
Subsidy, 9 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 89, 91 (1998) ("[M]oney need not actually change hands
for a subsidy to exist.").
42. The "bookkeeping" project resembles an endeavor pursued in the media during the
spring of 2003: trying to identify the true costs of war in Iraq. Politicians' pre-war estimates
of the necessary appropriations ranged from $200 billion to $2 trillion. Jurgen Brauer,
Economist: Achieve War Goal with Ledger Book, Not Laser Bombs, ATLANTA J.-CONST.,
Mar. 3, 2003, at A7. "Bookkeeping" arguments are familiar; many writers seek to expand the
concept of truthful accounts in policymaking: according to one, economists are inclined to
"look at all costs, budgetary and otherwise." Id.; see also Eva Feder Kittay, A Feminist Pub-
lic Ethic of Care Meets the New Communitarian Family Policy, 111 ETHICS 523, 546-57 (2001)
(contending that "dependency work" and harm to the environment can be subjected to im-
proved cost-benefit accounting). I have argued that better "bookkeeping" might enhance
both tort law and international human rights law. Anita Bernstein, Conjoining International
Human Rights Law with Enterprise Liability for Accidents, 40 WASHBURN L.J.




rules and institutions. At a tertiary level, norms and conventions asso-
ciated with state-sponsored marriage create detriments.
In calling this review "bookkeeping," I do not say that state-
sponsored marriage has an exact price that an auditor can quantify.
Instead, the review brings a crucial missing dimension to what advo-
cates have identified as a slam-dunk utilitarian case. Activists have
achieved, and seek more, legislation; the value of legislation lies in the
balance of improvement over detriment that it can accomplish.43 To
the extent that marriage is a creature of the legislature, it ought to be
on the books only if it makes the public better off.
From this base, Part IV, "Revising the 'Case,' " undertakes a pre-
liminary defense of state-sponsored marriage that faces, rather than
denies, the extensive social disutility that this legal institution fosters.
Once marriage is identified as a source of losses that the "case for
marriage" has failed to confront, those who would preserve state-
sponsored marriage need arguments beyond the facile and tautological
quasi-utilitarianism that now dominates public analysis. Part IV re-
counts two cogent arguments for marriage. The first one claims that
individuals need access to this status in order to flourish; the second
claims that men must have access to marriage, both for their own good
and the good of society. Without endorsing these arguments, I contrast
them favorably to the inadequate "case"; they may not persuade, but
they make sense given their own premises, even when compared to a
society without marriage.
The query that still needs to be framed, which I broach at the end
of the Article, is: Compared to what? As an institution that imposes
social control, marriage, though flawed and unjust, is better than its
competitors. Ending status-based constraints in the law works well
where the area governed does not need regulation: the erosion of race
as a legal status offers a strong example of this kind of healthy disap-
pearance. Intimate lives, however, do appear to need some regulation,
even when children are not present," and of all potential regulators -
the only alternatives are the state and the market - marriage offers
the most compelling benefits.
I. MARRIAGE AS A LEGAL CATEGORY: A SURVEY OF THE LAW
AT STAKE
This Part considers the proposal to abolish state-sponsored mar-
riage by looking at its feasibility and consequences, raising two ques-
43. See generally JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., Univ. of London Althone
Press 1970) (1879) (justifying legislation in terms of producing happiness).
44. I elaborate below. See infra text accompanying notes 342-355.
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tions. First, would American law permit the abolition of state-
sponsored marriage? The answer is yes. Second, what would change?
Numerous entitlements and duties mandated in federal and state law
would be wiped off the books.
A. The Constitutional Law of Marriage
Reformers have learned that the United States Constitution is neu-
tral on the abolition of state-sponsored marriage. Although the Su-
preme Court has issued pronouncements on the importance of this
institution,45 nothing in its decisional law requires the states or the fed-
eral government to continue recognizing marital status. Decisional law
on marriage sets only a handful of constraints. Substantive due process
limitations on government power prevent the state from arbitrarily
withholding access to marriage from dual-gendered couples. The con-
stitutional guarantee of equal protection prevents the state from con-
ditioning access to marriage on classifications that lack a reason. These
two categories provide all the constitutional law of marriage; no other
constitutional doctrine gives citizens an entitlement to state recogni-
tion of the dyads they choose to form.
1. Negative Liberties: The Constitutionality of the Abolition Process
When it ceases to accept that two adults may fuse themselves to-
gether in the eyes of the law, the state is abstaining from action, rather
than acting. The end of state-sponsored marriage is thus like the end
of any other affirmative initiative in public welfare. Because the
Supreme Court has long rejected demands for affirmative entitlements
cast as constitutional rights - among them health care, government-
funded abortion, and education at a state-mandated level of quality'
- the Court cannot rely on its precedents to recognize a constitutional
right to be married in the eyes of the law.
In this negative-liberties perspective, the government may abolish
marriage if it does so without derogation of established due process
and equal protection rights. Because the nullification of existing mar-
riages would serve to deprive married persons of quasi-property, or
45. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383 (1978) (noting that marriage is "of
fundamental importance"); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (stating that mar-
riage is "fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race").
46. See Harris v. McCrae, 448 U.S. 297, 317-18 (1980) (abortion funding); San Antonio
Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 37-39 (1973) (school financing); Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 483-87 (1970) (welfare funding).
One might argue that state-sponsored marriage is more like the "process" than the "sub-
stance" of funded entitlements. Even if this contention is correct, cf infra Part III (arguing
that state-sponsored marriage is about money), the core of a procedural right is that it may
not be allocated capriciously. The withdrawal of marriage from everyone avoids this pitfall.
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impair their contracts, abolition as new legislative policy would pose
fewer risks if it took place prospectively, with an effective date set well
in the future. Alternatively, state-sponsored marriage could be al-
lowed to elapse through a slow evolution of public withdrawal and dis-
taste, rather than fiat. The abolition of marriage could not be re-
stricted to subgroups, or launched as an experiment that treats sub-
groups of Americans differently in violation of equal protection law.
With negative-liberties safeguards in place, the retreat of marriage
from American law would avoid inflicting legally cognizable harm on
American citizens.
2. Substantive Due Process
When the Supreme Court referred to the Due Process Clause in
invalidating a Virginia ban on interracial marriage, it noted that "[t]he
freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital per-
sonal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
men."47 One might read this dictum from Loving v. Virginia as assur-
ing Americans some kind of automatic state recognition of their cou-
pling, at their behest. But the Loving Court took pains to guarantee no
such thing. Immediately after siting the Lovings' right to marry in the
Due Process Clause, the Court went on to add that it would be wrong
to withhold marriage from them "on so unsupportable a basis" as ra-
cial classification.48 What Loving found unconstitutional, then, was not
the foreclosing of marriage per se, but rather the baseless denial of
marriage to a couple that had done nothing to deserve this singular
deprivation.49
As the Supreme Court has seen them, substantive due process
rights have never included a right to obtain any governmental benefit
or imprimatur, unless a litigant can contend that the government has
been distributing this benefit to some recipients. There is no substan-
tive due process right to boons and gifts. According to case law, sub-
stantive due process in the context of marriage does not include a right
47. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
48. Id. In other words, a fundamental right to marriage means that the state must have a
compelling reason before it may interfere with the law-based coupling it recognizes, not that
it must continue bestowing law-based recognition to couples.
49. The Court's other marriage-as-a-fundamental right cases following Loving also indi-
cate that marriage may indeed be withheld for good reason. See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.
78, 99 (1987) (deeming a Missouri rule prohibiting prison inmates from marrying "not rea-
sonably related to legitimate penological objectives," but noting that other restrictions on
marriage would have been acceptable); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 388-90 (1978)
(calling Wisconsin's withholding of marriage from persons in child support arrears poorly
tailored to the problem of nonsupport).
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to be declared the father of one's biological child,5" nor a right to know
that one's wife is having an abortion,51 nor a right to impose a paternal
surname on one's child.52 States may bestow and take away marriage-
related privileges, moreover, as they see fit. 3
3. Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause served many litigants well when they
pressed their right-to-marry claims in the Supreme Court. Loving v.
Virginia,54 Zablocki v. Redhail,55 and Turner v. Safley56 held that an
equal protection right, as well as a due process right, was violated
when Richard Loving, Mildred Jeter, Roger Redhail, and Leonard
Safley were prohibited from marrying. For litigants, the Equal Protec-
tion Clause has been integral to marriage as a constitutional right. 7
But it can say nothing against the obliteration of state-sponsored mar-
riages. That maneuver by government would take marriage away from
everybody - not just prison inmates, or deadbeat parents, or couples
who dare to defy a custom of racial division. Put another way, every
equal protection claim needs a government classification, and the abo-
lition of state-sponsored marriage would lead to fewer classifications
than now exist.
A crucial equal protection decision in the annals of marriage case
law, Eisenstadt v. Baird,58 specifically insisted in dicta that the state
50. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 114, 129-30 (1989) (plurality opinion) (hold-
ing that a man lacked a constitutional right to be declared the father of a child when his pa-
ternity was established to 98.07% certainty).
51. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 887-98 (1992) (striking down various
husband-notification requirements).
52. Neal v. Neal, 941 S.W.2d 501, 503-04 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (holding that in the pres-
ence of a mother's objections, a father could not unilaterally convey his own surname to his
child); see also Huffman v. Fisher, 987 S.W.2d 269, 274 (Ark. 1999) (detailing a "best inter-
est" standard for surname imposition when parents disagree).
53. Georgia, for instance, deviates from the majority of states in refusing to guarantee
widows and widowers a share of their spouses' estates at death. See Lawrence W. Waggoner,
Marital Property Rights in Transition, 59 Mo. L. REV. 21, 47 & n.68 (1994) (discussing
Georgia's unusual choice). It also clings to intramarital immunity for tort claims. GA. CODE
ANN. § 19-3-8 (2002).
54. 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).
55. 434 U.S. 374, 383-91 (1978).
56. 482 U.S. 78, 94-100 (1987).
57. Indeed, one of the Justices wrote that the Clause provides more than enough power
to invalidate a Wisconsin denial of marriage to one subset of noncustodial parents: those
who do not, or cannot, pay child support. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 406 (1978)
(Stevens, J., concurring).
58. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
November 2003]
Michigan Law Review
may not treat married people better than the unmarried. 9 Working
with Griswold v. Connecticut as a precedent, Justice Brennan re-
minded his readers that individuals and not couples are what concern
the law:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the
marital relationship. Yet the marital couple is not an independent entity
with a mind and a heart of its own, but an association of two individuals
each with a separate intellectual and emotional makeup. If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, married or single,
to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fun-
damentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.6°
B. Longstanding Federal Nonconstitutional Law
In 1996, Representative Henry Hyde sought to find out what
Congress had achieved when it approved the Defense of Marriage
Act,6' the first federal statute to proclaim a definition of marriage.
Hyde asked the General Accounting Office ("GAO") "to identify
federal laws in which benefits, rights, and privileges are contingent on
marital status."62 In response, GAO staffers searched electronic ver-
sions of the United States Code looking for pertinent words and word
stems, and came up with a count of 1049 federal laws. 63 The major ones
are noted here.
1. Tax
Federal tax policy recognizes marriage in numerous respects. For
example, the joint return, available also for state income taxes, treats
married couples as one taxpaying unit.' A marriage "penalty" or "bo-
nus" reflects the consequences of marital filing: some couples pay less
tax, and others pay more, based on their marital status.6 ' Federal law
uses marriage as a way to defer tax obligations when an affluent indi-
vidual dies leaving a widowed spouse, who inherits.' Gift tax law takes
59. Eisenstandt, 405 U.S. at 453.
60. Id.
61. 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
62. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT, GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE REP. OGC-97-16, at 1 (1997) [hereinafter GAO REPORT
OGC-97-16].
63. GAO REPORT OGC-97-16, supra note 62, at 2.
64. I.R.C. § 6013(a) (2003).
65. I.R.C. § 6013(a).
66. I.R.C. § 2056.
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the marital status of donors and recipients into account when deter-
mining tax liabilities.67 Property transfers between spouses are not
subject to gain-loss valuation.68
2. Military and Veterans Law
Military service and marriage come together in veterans' benefits,
which "include pensions, indemnity compensation for service-
connected deaths, medical care, nursing home care, right to burial in
veterans' cemeteries, educational assistance, and housing."69 Spouses
of service personnel share in these statutory entitlements.7" The GAO
has described military spouses' benefits, including employment assis-
tance and commissary privileges, as "unique."7 Spouses of federal ci-
vilian employees can also claim various distributions, such as insurance
payments and retirement annuities. Disability payments for work re-
lated injuries may increase if a federal employee has a spouse.72
3. Immigration
When aliens receive special residency status due to their employ-
ment, their spouses may also receive special status.73 The "fianc6e
visa" recognizes a couple's intention to marry.74 The entitlement to
share residency privileges with a spouse opens aliens' marriages to
administrative scrutiny. If the federal government believes that a cou-
ple married only to provide residency privileges to an alien spouse, it
can declare the marriage a sham and deport the alien.7"
4. Family Medical Leave
The Family and Medical Leave Act of 199376 has been on the
books for more than a decade, qualifying as "longstanding" for pur-
67. I.R.C. § 2501.
68. I.R.C. § 1041.
69. GAO REPORT OGC-97-16, supra note 62, at 3.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 4.
72. Id. at 5.
73. 8 U.S.C. § 1153(d) (2000).
74. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(15)(K)(i), 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).
75. Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration Law: Employer Sanctions
and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669, 672-73 (1997) (noting the "highly intrusive
investigation techniques" that are used to determine the validity of an immigrant's mar-
riage).
76. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
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poses of classification in this Part." Under this statute, all employers
with fifty or more employees must extend unpaid leave to workers
who wish to care for a parent, child, or spouse.7" Unrelated adults in
need of the employee's care do not trigger the employer's obligation; a
spouse is the only adult of the employee's generation who qualifies for
this employer-supported benefit.7 9
5. Evidentiary Privileges
In addition to these statutory recognitions of marriage, federal
common law, which holds strong in the law of evidence, also recog-
nizes the marital relation.' In evidence law a husband and wife retain
some of their corhmon law, coverture-based oneness. Until 1933, a
married person was deemed incompetent to testify in favor of his
spouse in federal court."1 This drawback to being married has been
replaced by evidentiary rules that make being married a source of
power for witnesses and parties to litigation. Two significant marital
privileges have endured: the privilege to exclude adverse spousal tes-
timony, and the confidential marital communications privilege. Confi-
dential marital communications are absolutely privileged from disclo-
sure, and either spouse may invoke the privilege.82
C. Longstanding State-Level Laws
Defense-of-marriage laws on the books of a majority of states
underscore an extensive statutory and common law scheme that
bolsters marriage. Not every state gives equal regard to marriage;
California, Vermont, and Hawaii, for example, have been leaders in
blurring the lines between the statuses of married and unmarried.83
77. Cf. infra Part II.B (noting more recent changes in state and federal law that are at-
tributable to the mid-1990s "marriage movement").
78. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(2), 2612, 2614.
79. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C). See generally Nancy J. King, The Family Medical Leave
Act: An Ethical Model for Human Resource Policies and Decisions, 83 MARQ. L. REV. 321,
355 (1999) (criticizing this stance).
80. See FED. R. EVID. 501 (recognizing common-law evidentiary privileges); see also
infra Part I.C.6 (examining evidentiary privileges at the state level).
81. Funk v. United States, 290 U.S. 371, 380-82 (1933).
82. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 4, at 395 (citing People v. Vermeulen, 438
N.W.2d 36 (Mich. 1989) (allowing a defendant charged with murdering his second wife to
exclude the testimony of his first wife, to whom he had confided his plan to murder the sec-
ond wife)); see United States v. Rakes, 136 F.3d 1, 2-6 (1st Cir. 1998) (ordering confidential
marital communications suppressed); United States v. Porter, 986 F.2d 1014, 1018 (6th Cir.
1993) (stating prerequisites to assertion of this privilege).
83. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
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Nevertheless, all recognize marriage as a legal category with money
and privileges at stake.
1. Inheritance and Post-Death Benefits
When a married person dies holding assets, his or her spouse will
almost certainly inherit at least a portion of those assets, unless the
surviving spouse waived claims to them in an antenuptial contract - a
bargain that by hypothesis gave the now-widowed spouse something in
exchange.' Many states forbid the disinheriting of spouses, and all of
them establish wives and husbands as default beneficiaries when dece-
dents die without a will, a common scenario.85 Most state laws favor
spouses over the decedent's siblings when the decedent has made no
will and has no children; the Uniform Probate Code provides that
spouses typically inherit a large portion of the estate, even when the
intestate decedent had children.86 Married decedents who die intestate
may not have intended to leave money to their wives or husbands, but
the state in effect chooses to write a will benefiting these widowed
spouses.
In addition to collecting money by inheritance, a surviving spouse
will typically enjoy a preference to be appointed the personal repre-
sentative when the spouse dies intestate.87 This widow or widower can
also claim worker's compensation survivor benefits.88 It is he or she
whom the law usually empowers to decide how to dispose of the dece-
dent's remains, whether to make anatomical gifts from the decedent's
body,89 and whether to bring a wrongful death or survival action.' °
84. "Consideration" stands for the notion that all parties to a valid contract give up
something and gain something when the contract is formed. To be sure, consideration is
frequently absent, or misperceived, in intramarital contracts. See Katharine B. Silbaugh,
Marriage Contracts and the Family Economy, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 65, 79-80 (1998) (noting
incoherent judicial treatment of the consideration requirement for marital contracts). Never-
theless, courts typically scrutinize prenuptial agreements for fairness more than contracts
between unrelated adults. Id. at 74-77.
85. See Waggoner, supra note 53, passim.
86. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102(1) (1998); see also Waggoner, supra note 53, at 27.
87. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 5-305(c). Most states also follow a presumption of spousal
guardianship when a married person becomes mentally incapacitated, and ignore unmarried
partners for this purpose. See David L. Chambers, What I. The Legal Consequences of Mar-
riage and the Legal Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L. REV. 447, 456-57
(1996).
88. Albina Engine & Mach. Works v. O'Leary, 328 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1964) (using
state law to determine whether a claimant was a "surviving wife" for purposes of obtaining
federal workers' compensation benefits).
89. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GiFr ACT § 3(a) (1987).
90. See Nancy J. Knauer, The September 11 Attacks and Surviving Same-Sex Partners:




Although only nine states follow the Spanish-derived marital prop-
erty regime that sees spouses as holding "a present, undivided, one-
half interest in all property acquired by the efforts of either spouse
during the marriage," 91 these states include California and Texas, first
and third in population, respectively. The minority regime of commu-
nity property therefore covers twenty-eight percent of Americans.92
Community property understands marriage as a property-holding unit
that overrides the individual predilections and desires of a spouse. Al-
though it excludes some separate property from the marital commu-
nity, community-property regimes impose a strong legal oneness on
the holdings of married individuals.
3. Deferred Community Property
In the majority of states that follow the common law approach to
marital property, and thus do not locate a property-holding commu-
nity within marriage, community-property influences will manifest
themselves upon divorce as well as upon death. For purposes of asset
division in divorce, many states presume that "[aill property acquired
by either spouse after the marriage and before a decree of legal sepa-
ration is presumed to be marital property."'93 This rule implicitly ac-
cepts the community-property proviso that excludes gifts, inheritances,
and other acquisitions unrelated to the title-holding spouse's efforts.
Many states go further, rejecting the proviso and permitting courts to
divide any assets that either spouse holds - even assets that would
have been separate property in a community-property regime.94 Such
property-division rules, like community property, place tremendous
emphasis on the fact of a marriage, recognizing no other type of union
as a source of so much compelled sharing between two individuals.
to sue for wrongful death" is part of the "decision-making authority typically reserved for
spouses").
91. WEISBERG & APPLETON, supra note 4, at 255 n.8.
92. The nine community property states, Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada,
New Mexico, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin, had 80,692,128 people in 2000, when the
nation's population stood at about 281,000,000. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000, at
tbl.2 (2000) available at http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/tab02.pdf (Dec. 28, 2000).
93. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307 (1970).
94. Linda D. Elrod & Robert G. Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law: Redefin-
ing Families, Reforming Custody Jurisdiction, and Refining Support Issues, 34 FAM. L.Q. 607,
657 (2001) (noting twenty-one jurisdictions).
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4. Consortium
In most of the United States, anyone who injures a married person
is deemed also to have injured the spouse of that individual, and state
laws allow the spouse to sue the tortfeasor for harm to the marital re-
lationship.95 Many states extend this entitlement to parents or children
of the injured person, but case law around the country typically rejects
the consortium claims of same-sex partners, plaintiffs who were
merely engaged to the injured person, and other litigants who fall
short of being married.96 Tort law further underscores the importance
of marriage by regarding the spouse's claim as derivative; this stance
generally forces the spouse to sue in the same action as the direct vic-
tim and attributes weaknesses in the direct victim's claim (such as
flaws in the prima facie case, or contributory negligence) to the
spouse.97
5. Tenancy by the Entirety
Many states recognize a unique form of shared ownership that only
a married couple can enjoy. Tenants by the entirety hold property per
tout et non per my, in the Norman phrase - "by the whole and not by
the share."9 This form of concurrent ownership resembles a joint ten-
ancy, except that it adds a fifth unity, the unity of marriage, to the four
unities needed to create joint tenancy: unity of time, title, interest, and
possession.9 One writer calls tenancy by the entirety "a particularly
difficult form of doublethink: to think about two persons as though
they were one."' ° Many state courts have interpreted the creation of
separate legal personhood in the Married Women's Property Acts to
require the abolition of tenancy by the entirety.' In the states that
95. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 842-43 (2000).
96. See, e.g., Trombley v. Starr-Wood Cardiac Group, 3 P.3d 916, 922-23 (Alaska 2000)
(denying consortium to a plaintiff who was merely engaged, not married, to the direct vic-
tim); Feliciano v. Rosemar Silver Co., 514 N.E.2d 1095, 1096 (Mass. 1987) (denying loss-of-
consortium claim to a plaintiff who had co-habited with the victim for more than twenty
years before the injury); cf. Coon v. Joseph, 237 Cal. Rptr. 873, 877-78 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that a same-sex partner could not recover as a bystander for negligent infliction of
emotional distress).
97. DOBBS, supra note 95.
98. JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 323 (4th ed. 1998) (translating
"my" as "moieties" rather than "share").
99. Id. at 322-23.
100. John V. Orth, Tenancy by the Entirety: The Strange Career of the Common-Law
Marital Estate, 1997 BYU L. REV. 35, 40.
101. Steve R. Johnson, Fog, Fairness, and the Federal Fisc: Tenancy-by-the-Entireties
Interests and the Federal Tax Lien, 60 MO. L. REV. 839, 843 (1995).
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have kept it, however, a crucial practical distinction emerges between
tenancy by the entirety and joint tenancy: whereas property held in
joint tenancy is accessible to one spouse's creditors, property held in
tenancy by the entirety often cannot be reached.1 °2 This version of
concurrent ownership gives married individuals a place to keep their
property safe from third-party seizure. If not for marriage, they would
have no such refuge.
6. Evidentiary Privileges
In thirteen states, a person can stop his or her spouse from testify-
ing adversely. 3 The broader confidential-communications privilege
covers disclosure between husbands and wives in the confidence of the
marital relationship.1 °4 Both the adverse-testimony and the confiden-
tial-communications privileges rest on an ancient marital unity, the
destruction of which would "destroy the best solace of human exis-
tence," according to venerable Supreme Court decisional law."
II. HOW THE "CASE FOR MARRIAGE" HAS AFFECTED MARRIAGE
AS A LEGAL CATEGORY
While the law of marriage described in the last Part rests rather
ponderously on an old "tradition," marriage-related doctrine has
moved down newer paths. Marriage laws formed in the past assigned
privileges, and a few detriments, to married individuals unselfcon-
sciously, without stating much of an agenda. Newer laws promote mar-
riage as a measure of social engineering. °6 This shift toward overt at-
tempts to improve individuals' lives and social welfare invites critical
attention: proposals, arguments, new legislation, and social science are
available for scrutiny.
102. These states are Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Maryland, Missouri,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia, and Wyoming, plus the District of
Columbia. See Sawada v. Endo, 561 P.2d 1291, 1294-95 (Haw. 1977) (surveying national law).
103. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal Privilege and the Meanings of Marriage, 81 VA. L.
REV. 2045, 2047-48 (1995).
104. LESLIE J. HARRIS & LEE E. TEITELBAUM, FAMILY LAW 144 (2d ed. 2000). One
commentator reports that the confidential-communications privilege "is recognized by the
District of Columbia and all fifty states, except possibly Connecticut." Pamela A. Haun, The
Marital Privilege in the Twenty-First Century, 32 U. MEM. L. REV. 137, 159 (2001).
105. Stein v. Bowman, 38 U.S. 209, 223 (1839).
106. Katherine Shaw Spaht takes a differing view, arguing that over the last century the
law has withdrawn from marriage, and so the contemporary marriage movement amounts to
a "counter-revolution." Katherine Shaw Spaht, Revolution and Counter-Revolution: The
Future of Marriage in the Law, 49 LOY. L. REV. 1, 6, 28 (2003). Professor Spaht dedicates her
article "to the courageous and intellectually honest individuals throughout this country who
are members of the nascent Marriage Movement." Id. at 1.
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A. The "Case for Marriage" Emerges from the Marriage Movement
As an umbrella term, "the marriage movement" covers a variety of
organizations with overlapping memberships and common agendas. 7
The movement has extensive ties to religious organizations and politi-
cal conservatives, groups that have held influence in the American po-
litical arena for decades. These sectors galvanized the Republican vote
that helped install Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan into the presi-
dency in past decades. Such successes gave social conservatives robust
political power, but until the mid-1990s these activists could point to
few legislative successes.
Enter neutral, universalist social science as a base to support law
reform. When buttressed by data, family-values activism gained credi-
bility in policymaking.1 8 Other stances and arguments can make only a
partial case for marriage. Your spiritual orientation, or my geographic
community, might applaud our being married, but when making policy
arguments these subgroups cannot speak for an entire nation. Moreo-
ver, to the extent such teachings amount only to religious dogma, the
government may not establish them as policy. Only if marriage is good
for us as a society, independent of sectarian faith, should the state
promote it. 1" Numbers, not just traditionalist teachings, must support
the conclusion that being married rather than unmarried conduces to
the welfare of Americans.11°
107. Although the movement casts itself as diverse, my own premise is that it unites
around family-values conservatism. For support, see Judith Stacey, Family Values Forever,
NATION, July 9, 2001, at 26. The arguments I make in this section do not require a reader to
accept either view.
The movement made an early appearance with Marriage in America: A Report to the
Nation, published in 1995, which focused on marriage as a source of benefit to children. See
The Council on Families in America, Marriage in America: A Report to the Nation, in
PROMISES TO KEEP, supra note 3, at 293-318. In 1997, sociologists David Popenoe and
Barbara Dafoe Whitehead formed the National Marriage Project at Rutgers University, a
source of research about marriage and family life. This group issues an annual report called
The State of Our Unions. These activists brought their work to the National Institute of
Health, which in 1998 sponsored an inaugural pro-marriage conference.
108. See generally Stacey, supra note 107. For a sympathetic exploration of the links
between social conservatives and the marriage movement, see W. BRADFORD WILCOX,
SACRED VOWS, PUBLIC PURPOSES: RELIGION, THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT, AND
MARRIAGE POLICY (2002), available at http://pewforum.org/publications/reports/marriage-
policy.pdf (May 2002).
109. See Jonathan Rauch, For Better or Worse?, NEW REPUBLIC, May 6, 1996, at 19 ("If
we want to know what and whom marriage is for in modem America, we need a sensible
secular doctrine.").
110. Brian Bix makes a related plea for clarity on what exactly state recognition of mar-
riage achieves. See Brian H. Bix, State of the Union: The States' Interest in the Marital Status
of Their Citizens, 55 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 7 (2000) (claiming that the state interest in mar-
riage goes beyond "the Utilitarian justification that a state prefers having its citizens' prefer-
ences satisfied").
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In 2000, sociologist Linda Waite and a journalist co-author, Maggie
Gallagher, presented a leading manifesto for the movement."n Com-
pact and cards-on-the-table explicit, The Case for Marriage: Why Mar-
ried People Are Happier, Healthier, and Better Off Financially will
stand in for the larger body of case-for-marriage literature in this Arti-
cle." 2 The Case for Marriage, lining up married Americans on one side
opposite unmarried Americans on the other, deems the former cate-
gory significantly advantaged. Joined by other writers, Waite and
Gallagher demonstrate that married persons enjoy longer life and bet-
ter health than the unmarried." 3 Married persons also possess more
wealth," 4 have sex more often and with more satisfaction,"5 report
more happiness, 116 and rear better-adjusted children. Although it does
not deny that many individuals suffer detriment in their marriages and
would be better off single, the "case" finds no aggregate drawbacks to
marriage. As many see the data, there is no significant demographic
variable where singles as a group enjoy more well-being than married
persons. 7
111. LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY
MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY (2000).
112. See also DAVID POPENOE, LIFE WITHOuT FATHER (1996) (arguing that children
benefit from marriage); MARRIAGE, HEALTH, AND THE PROFESSIONS (John Wall et al. eds.,
2002) (arguing that the benefits of marriage suggest implications for various professions);
James Q. Wilson, The Decline of Marriage, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Feb. 17, 2002, at G1
(advocating that the state shore up marriage). Other works make the argument in passing.
See, e.g., WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES 284-85 (1991) (identifying a state
interest in marriage based on the superiority of the two-parent household); Chambers, supra
note 87, at 490 (declaring that governments "seem justified in favoring a special relationship
with someone known as a spouse over other relationships of friendship or kinship").
113. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111, at 47-64; John Wall & Don S. Browning,
Introduction to MARRIAGE, HEALTH, AND THE PROFESSIONS, supra note 112.
114. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111, at 97-123.
115. Linda J. Waite & Kara Joyner, Emotional Satisfaction and Physical Pleasure in
Sexual Unions: Time Horizon, Sexual Behavior, and Sexual Exclusivity, 63 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 247, 253-63 (2001).
116. Ed Diener & Martin E.P. Seligman, Very Happy People, 13 PSYCHOL. Sci. 81, 84
(2002).
Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman has cast doubt on the reliability of self-reports of hap-
piness, however. In an extensive study he found that divorced women deemed their lives less
satisfying than did married women. Nevertheless, they were more cheerful than married
women over the course of a day. Erica Goode, A Conversation with Daniel Kahneman: On
Profit, Loss and the Mystery of the Mind, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2002, at Fl. Journalist Laura
Miller interprets this finding as divorced women's complying with a social imperative to see
themselves as miserable, even though they are in fact happier than married women. Laura
Miller, State of the Single Woman, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Dec. 28, 2002, at M19, available
at http://archive.salon.com/books/feature/200212/12/single/indexnp.html (Dec. 12,2002).
117. But see Elizabeth Cooksey, Consequences of Young Mothers' Marital Histories for
Children's Cognitive Development, 59 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 245, 245-61 (1997) (suggesting
that among low-income African Americans, children from single-parent homes do better in
school than counterparts from two-parent homes); Stephanie Coontz & Nancy Folbre, Mar-
riage, Poverty, and Public Policy: A Discussion Paper from the Council on Contemporary
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Clear policy implications emerge, advocates say. At a minimum,
the United States needs more marriages - simply because every mar-
riage, ceteris paribus, flips two persons from the disadvantaged into
the advantaged category, augmenting national welfare - and it also
should encourage individuals to choose marriage over singleness." 8
More is needed, some marriage advocates say. They divide on thorny
issues like divorce restrictions and protecting traditional opposite-sex
marriage from same-sex initiatives. In reviewing the "case for mar-
riage," however, I restrict myself to its consensus, the core rather than
peripheries: marriage is good; more marriage would be better.
B. Law Reforms Following the "Case"
1. Covenant Marriage
Marriage partisans have worked to create a more solemn, alterna-
tive form of state-sponsored marriage in order to remedy an excess
they perceive in the divorce rate: couples, they say, tend to flee their
marriages too quickly.'19 In this view, the liberalized grounds for di-
vorce that began with California's no-fault reform left Americans
worse off. Codified now in three states and under consideration else-
where, covenant marriage allows couples to reject no-fault or easy di-
vorce for themselves by signing a declaration of intent when they
marry. Their declaration affirms the importance of marriage, and per-
sons who choose covenant marriage accept premarital counseling and
agree to forgo some of the easier avenues to dissolution. In Louisiana,
where this innovation takes its strongest form, a covenant marriage
can be dissolved only for adultery, conviction of a felony with subse-
quent imprisonment, desertion for at least one year, physical abuse of
a spouse or child, or a two-year separation.12 ° The Arkansas version is
similar. Watering covenant marriage down to very little at the time
Families' Fifth Annual Conference (Apr. 26-28, 2002), at http://www.contemporary-
families.org/publichbriefing.html (offering data on how disruptive it is to get a stepparent in a
child's life and describing how, among unstable couples, a first violent episode often occurs
soon after a formal commitment). One trivial negative effect of being married, according to
the "case," is that married men and women are more likely to be overweight and not to ex-
ercise (even though they are healthier). Linda J. Waite, The Health Benefits of Marriage, in
MARRIAGE, HEALTH, AND THE PROFESSIONS, supra note 112, at 17.
118. See, e.g., COALITION FOR MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND COUPLES EDUCATION ET AL.,
THE MARRIAGE MOVEMENT: A STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (2000), available at
http://www.marriagemovement.org/html/MMStatement.html (Whether an individual ever
personally marries or not, a healthy marriage culture benefits every citizen in the United
States ... ").
119. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and
Legal Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 63, 66-70 (1998) (discussing, inter alia, the work of
Maggie Gallagher, David Popenoe, and Barbara Dafoe Whitehead).
120. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:272, 9:307 (2001) (enacted 1997).
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of dissolution, Arizona permits these marriages to end by mutual
consent.121
Critics like to dismiss covenant marriage as trivial, often citing the
tiny percentage of marrying couples who choose 'premium' instead of
'regular' when given a choice, 22 but the endeavor extends beyond a
handful of couples in Louisiana, Arizona, and Arkansas. Most state
legislatures that have rejected covenant-marriage bills have accepted
lesser measures with the same purpose of shoring up marriage. One
favored statutory provision encourages marital counseling, not only at
the divorce decision point but also as part of premarital education.
23
2. Slowing Divorce
Going beyond covenant marriage, the marriage movement has
pursued other law reforms to make divorces proceed more slowly. Re-
peals of no-fault divorce have not yet made it into the states' law
books, but legislators continually propose, for instance, to amend no-
fault divorce by requiring mutual consent (an approach that has pre-
vailed in New York all along, but amounts to a conservative change in
many other states) or to lengthen waiting periods in no-fault divorces
involving children.12 4 Process-oriented reforms have been easier to en-
act. Several states have in recent years modified their court-ordered
divorce mediation programs to introduce marriage-friendly mediation,
which encourages couples to reconcile. Traditional mediation, by con-
trast, strives only for an amicable dissolution.2 1
3. Transfer Payments
Governments channel funds toward marriage-booster programs.
Several state-level initiatives purport to sweeten the deal for those
who marry or stay married, offering payments that reward getting
married with cash. 6 When President George W. Bush announced in
121. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-901 to 25-906 (2000).
122. See Stark, supra note 7, at 1487 n.29 (noting low participation rate). I borrow the
premium-or-regular phrase from a former student, Chandra Jones, who came up with it here
in gas-guzzling Atlanta.
123. Marilyn Weber Serafini, Get Hitched, Stay Hitched, 34 NAT'L J. 694, 696 (2002).
124. William A. Galston, Divorce American Style, PUB. INT., Summer 1996, at 12,21-24.
125. For the traditional view, see Judith M. Wolf, Sex, Lies, and Divorce Mediation,
ARIZ. ATT'Y, Nov. 1996, at 25, 34, who notes that "[m]ediation is not designed to bring the
marriage back together." But see Alison E. Gerencser, Family Mediation: Screening for Do-
mestic Abuse, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 43, 49 n.37 (1995) (noting that California pioneered
"court-connected conciliation services" aimed at reconciliation in 1939).
126. Mark O'Keefe, Marriage-Is-Better Movement Expands, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS,
July 27, 2001, at A3 (describing costly efforts in several states); see also WILCOX, supra note
108 (describing an elaborate $10 million effort in Oklahoma promoted by marriage-
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February 2002 that he intended to appropriate $300 million for mar-
riage initiatives,'127 a few states already had such programs underway.
In West Virginia, for instance, welfare recipients who marry receive an
extra hundred dollars per month."2 Florida and Minnesota reduce
marriage license fees for couples who prove they have taken a mar-
riage preparation course. 129
The Bush proposal was not the first federal marriage-promoting
declaration in recent memory to announce marriage-related effects on
transfer-payment entitlements. Welfare reform legislation in 1996 her-
alded marriage as "the foundation of a successful society."' 30 When it
inaugurated the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program, a
substitute for traditional federal aid to dependent persons, Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), Congress announced its
desire to "encourage the formation and maintenance of 2-parent fami-
lies." '' Wade Horn, founder of the Fatherhood Initiative, 32 had spent
years proposing federal expenditures on the cause before he was
named Assistant Secretary for Family Support in the Bush Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services.
The Bush administration named its family and welfare legislative
program "Working Toward Independence," linking marriage to free-
dom from dependency on government transfer payments. 34 Instead of
addressing needy families as the pre-1996 federal welfare program had
provided, "Working Toward Independence" would finance state-level
initiatives to foster marriage, and state governments would work with
"faith-based organizations."'35 In the 107th Congress, the House of
Representatives passed draft legislation, endorsing "healthy, married,
enthusiast Governor Frank Keating). For a summary of state marriage-promotion efforts,
some of which use financial inducements, see U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
STATE POLICIES TO PROMOTE MARRIAGE: PRELIMINARY REPORT (2002).
127. Robin Toner & Robert Pear, Bush Urges Work and Marriage Programs in Welfare
Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at A18.
128. O'Keefe, supra note 126.
129. See Mary Ellen Klas, Gov. Bush Hatching Families Initiative, PALM BEACH POST,
Dec. 18, 2002, at 1A (describing government programs); O'Keefe, supra note 126.
130. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-193, § 101, 110 Stat. 2105, 2110,2111 (1996).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 601(a) (2000).
132. For more information, see http://www.fatherhood.org/.
133. Katha Pollitt, Forward to the Past, NATION, July 9, 2001, at 10, 10.
134. Press Release, The White House, President Names Senior Advisor for Welfare
Policy, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/welfare-reform-announcement-




2-parent families," allocating $120 million for state programs to pro-
mote marriage.' 36
4. DOMA and "Baby DOMAs"
How much credit the marriage movement can take for the federal
Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA")1 3 ' and the state counterpart ver-
sions, or "baby DOMAs" now on the books in approximately thirty-
seven states, is uncertain. 38 Many consider the federal DOMA, signed
into law on September 21, 1996, to be a reaction to Baehr v. Lewin, a
1993 case that suggested the state constitution of Hawaii might require
the recognition of same-sex marriage. 39 Commentators also link the
federal DOMA with Romer v. Evans," which struck down an anti-
gay-rights initiative as unconstitutional and may have thereby encour-
aged gay-rights activists to pursue this prize. 4' It is likely that mar-
riage-policy activism and the DOMA phenomenon are not each
other's cause or effect, but rather separate facets of a renascent tradi-
tionalism.
Defense-of-marriage efforts and the marriage movement came to-
gether in a federal marriage amendment, introduced in the House of
Representatives in May 2002.142 This proposed amendment to the
Constitution would prohibit same-sex marriages. In interviews with
journalists, sponsors of this legislation spoke in the utilitarian, social-
engineering rhetoric characteristic of the marriage movement: es-
chewing religious references, they invoked "social policy" and a need
136. H.R. 4737, 107th Cong. (2002).
137. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1994), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2000).
138. The count is unsteady because states continue to consider both enactment
and repeal of these defense-of-marriage acts. The number thirty-seven was accurate as of
March 2003.
139. 852 P.2d 44, 59-60 (Haw. 1993) (calling Hawaiian equal protection law more
"elaborate" in its grants than the Fourteenth Amendment), superseded by HAW. CONST. art.
1, § 23 ("The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples.").
140. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
141. See Mark Strasser, Some Observations About DOMA, Marriages, Civil Unions, and
Domestic Partnerships, 30 CAP. U. L. REV. 363, 365 (2002) (suggesting Romer "has impor-
tant implications for the constitutionality of DOMA"); Veronica C. Abreu, Note, The Malle-
able Use of History in Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence: How the "Deeply Rooted" Test
Should Not Be a Barrier to Finding the Defense of Marriage Act Unconstitutional Under the
Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause, 44 B.C. L. REV. 177 (2002) (calling DOMA a reac-
tion to Baehr and Romer).
142. H.R.J. Res. 93, 107th Cong. (2002).
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to maintain "the union of two genders," which "has unique and irre-
placeable benefits for kids and society."143
C. The "Case" in a Skeptical Light. Toward Revision
The "case for marriage" draws a picture of goods and gains, and its
influence continues to change the law. A critical look at it, however,
casts these achievements in doubt. Marriage may not deserve the
credit for the welfare effects that often accompany being married.
Even if marriage did deserve this credit, these gains cannot support
retaining, as compared with abolishing, state-sponsored marriage.
1. Correlation and Causation
That married people are better off than unmarried people does not
demonstrate that marriage makes people better off. As critics of the
marriage movement have long charged, correlation is not causation. A
selection effect may be at work: perhaps individuals destined for
health and wealth want to get married before they achieve success,
have little trouble finding suitable partners, and smoothly stay married
throughout their lives.1" Individuals predisposed to illness and
poverty, by contrast, may have trouble forming stable and harmonious
relationships. It might be truer to say that such unfortunates are
not married because they are unhealthy, rather than that they are
unhealthy because they are not married.'45
Marriage partisans have worked diligently to refute this criticism.
Waite and Gallagher, for example, report that studies of sick persons
find that those who get married live longer than those who do not.46
Longitudinal studies, looking at the same cohort of people over time,
find happiness during the married years of their subjects' lives and
unhappiness during the divorced years. 47 The Case for Marriage also
identifies particular marital behaviors, like wifely nagging, that it finds
143. Stephanie Francis Cahill, Between a Man and a Woman: Federal Marriage Amend-
ment Would Ban Same-Sex Marriages, ABA J. E-REP., May 24, 2002, at WL 1 No. 20
ABAJEREP 5.
144. See Shankar Vedantam, Does a Ring Bring Happiness, or Vice Versa?, WASH.
POST, Apr. 21, 2003, at A9 (reporting a fifteen-year study of more than 24,000 persons in
Germany that identified a "set point" of happiness at which individuals tend to rest regard-
less of their marital status, suggesting that marrying does not of itself make people happier).
145. Cf. JESSIE BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 17 (1982) (quoting Samuel
Johnson as declaring marriage to be "the best state for man in general; and every man is a
worse man in proportion as he is unfit for the married state").
146. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111, at 51-52.




salubrious."4 But such evidence does not refute the selection effect; if
credited, it demonstrates only that getting married can convey a few
particular benefits.
Meanwhile, other effects cloud the picture, notably the correlation
between marriage and wealth.149 The prosperous marry at a high rate,
and tend to stay married; the poor are less likely to marry and more
likely to divorce. Low-income women look for economic stability in a
partner before marrying him, 5° and for their part, men, Cinderella-
rescue myths notwithstanding, apparently prefer wives who earn good
wages.51 Health and wealth are not independent variables: persons
with money also have good health insurance, access to wholesome
hospitals, shelter from street criminals and dangerous buildings, safe
distances from environmental pollution, and the prerogative to decline
jobs that would sicken or maim them. The odds are that such persons
have spouses too. If marriage can get credit for the welfare that pros-
perous people enjoy, then high-quality clothes and large houses de-
serve credit too. 52
2. Reasoning from a Base of Favoritism
Individuals are well-advised to follow a favored path rather than a
disfavored one, to the extent that they have a choice. The Case for
Marriage has duly commended marriage as something to get if you can
get it. "Buy them a copy of this book," urge Waite and Gallagher to
readers who have relatives or friends in a state of faltering faith, "and
highlight the parts on sex, health, wealth, or children, depending on
the situation."'53 Notwithstanding this recommendation to strangers
about the way they should live, The Case for Marriage provokes more
questions than it answers.
"[S]ex, health, wealth, children": the law chooses to interfere in all
of these realms to shift advantages to married persons. We can note
the four realms briefly in turn. When it criminalizes fornication and
148. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111, at 55.
149. See Coontz & Folbre, supra note 117.
150. Kathryn Edin, Few Good Men: Why Poor Mothers Don't Marry or Remarry, AM.
PROSPECT, Jan. 3, 2000, at 28.
151. Sharon Sassier & Robert Schoen, The Effect of Attitudes and Economic Activity on
Marriage, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 147, 148-49 (1999).
152. Ironically, Waite and Gallagher attack marriage critic Jessie Bernard for ignoring
the wealth effect. Bernard found single women less depressed than married women; Waite
and Gallagher retort that single women are economic elites. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra
note 111, at 165. Putting aside the question of whether single women really are economic
elites, the same reasoning would undermine many of their own assertions.
153. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111, at 191.
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adultery - as it still does in many places'54 - the state expresses dis-
approval of extramarital sex, a message that might correlatively vali-
date the experience of sex within marriage. Prison wardens typically
withhold conjugal visits from unmarried inmates.' Residential land-
lords around the United States are free in most locales to indulge a
prejudice against renting to unmarried couples.'56 Little wonder that
the married, subsidized by positive law, are at a sexual advantage.
Next, health. Extending employment-based medical insurance to
the spouses of workers, an allocation strategy that the law encourages
and fosters,'57 spreads health through marriage: whereas only a little
over half of single women have private health insurance, eighty-three
percent of married women have it.'58 Every married person has a next-
of-kin partner situated to intervene benevolently with the institutional
medical care that he or she will receive; the law extends this privilege
to spouses, but not to other persons, such as friends.159
Wealth-related legal interventions in favor of marriage are espe-
cially numerous. As I have mentioned and will detail, the joint income
tax return, gift and estate tax exemptions, transfer payments like
Social Security, standing to collect wrongful death and survivor and
consortium damages in tort litigation, access to health and life insur-
ance, protections in bankruptcy law, and numerous other privileges
categorically deliver wealth to married persons. The "children" item
154. See Oliverson v. W. Valley City, 875 F. Supp. 1465, 1474-75 (D. Utah 1995)
("[Miost states have continued to maintain adultery statutes as a part of their criminal
law."); C. Quince Hopkins, Rank Matters But Should Marriage?: Adultery, Fraternization,
and Honor in the Military, 9 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 177, 178 (1999) (noting that the contem-
porary U.S. military prosecutes adultery vigorously); Elaine Monaghan, Georgia Annuls
Ancient Law on Sex, TIMES (London), Jan. 16, 2003, at 17 (counting ten jurisdictions in the
United States that still criminalize fornication). Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),
which held that states could not criminalize sodomy, might be interpreted to invalidate the
crime of fornication, but this development has not yet taken hold.
155. Conjugal visits are scarce even for the married. James Doran, Voice of Experience
for the Executive Facing Jail, TIMES (London), Dec. 7, 2002, at 58 (quoting veteran inmate
who recommends that about-to-be-sentenced American white-collar criminals abandon their
hopes of conjugal visits during their incarceration).
156. David Kushner, Free Exercise, Fair Housing and Marital Status - Alaskan Style, 12
ALASKA L. REV. 335, 348-56 (1995) (surveying state laws). See generally Lawrence v. Texas,
123 S. Ct. 2472, 2496 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[I]n most States what the Court calls
'discrimination' against those who engage in homosexual acts is perfectly legal.").
157. See infra Part III.B.1.
158. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111, at 60. A freelance journalist recounted her
decision to abandon her ideological stance against marriage in order to obtain health insur-
ance. Sheelah Kolhatkar, In Sickness and Health (Care): Marrying To Get a 'Blue Card,'
FORWARD, May 23, 2003, at 1 ("Several days ago I developed a dreadful cough and started
feeling feverish. Fearing pneumonia, I rushed home to my boyfriend and said, 'Let's get
married!' ").




does not directly relate to the others on the list. Your relative or friend
who has doubts about marriage probably wants more sex, health, and
wealth, rather than less, but more children? Or is it fewer? In any
event, the law extends benefits to married parents that are unavailable
to unmarried ones.1" If marriage leaves us better off with respect to
sex, health, wealth, and children, then, we have laws - which can
be changed to take away privileged treatment - to thank for at
least some of this largesse. One might speak of the "case for being
privileged."
If the state were to get out of the marriage business, nobody would
be favored because nobody would be married in the official, blessed-
by-the-state sense that the marriage movement uses the term. To the
extent that the benefits of marriage come from something other than
positive law, marriage-like living arrangements unsanctioned by the
state would continue to leave people better off. 6' More intimacy of
any kind might be what does the trick. a6
Partisans suggest that marriage is unique, however, because by
raising the costs of exit it fosters the boons of specialization and
comparative advantage. You go conquer the market; I'll hone my
childrearing skills; in the end, together we'll have good money and
good kids, profiting more as a married couple than we would if we
160. Fathers are especially affected by this stance, as a look at Supreme Court prece-
dents confirms. For example, a man who begets a child out of wedlock and is not declared its
father in a formal filiation proceeding cannot be certain that his child will be able to inherit
from him if he dies intestate. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259, 264 (1978) (upholding a denial
of inheritance rights even though the decedent had acknowledged paternity in a notarized
document). In Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 250 (1983), the Court held that a biological
father was not entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard before his child was adopted
if he had not assumed any responsibility for the child's care. Lehr left open the question of
whether a mother could nullify all of the father's due process rights by cutting off his contact
with the child. See id. at 269-70 (White, J., dissenting); see also Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491
U.S. 110, 119-30 (1989) (plurality opinion) (holding that a man who fathered a child out of
wedlock, to whom he reportedly felt a deep connection, could not be declared the child's
father, because the California statute that irrebutably identified a mother's husband as the
father was constitutional).
161. Benefits to cohabitants provide an illustration. One advantage to being married in
the United States is access to intergenerational wealth transfers: parents of adult children
appear more forthcoming with gifts when their children have families of their own. WAITE &
GALLAGHER, supra note 111, at 117-18. Should legal marriage be abolished, perhaps these
generous parental impulses would continue and the paired-off, family-starting adult child
would continue to reap this benefit.
162. Interview by Patrick Perry with Dean Ornish, founder, Preventative Medicine Re-
search Institute, in Patrick Perry, Matters of the Heart, SAT. EVENING POST, Sept.-Oct. 1998,
at 38 (describing a Harvard study that correlated feeling close to one's parents in youth with
better health in midlife); see also Steven Stack, Marriage, Family and Loneliness: A Cross-
National Study, 41 SOC. PERsP. 415, 418 (1998) (finding that married people are less lonely
than single people, but noting that their being partnered, rather than married, might be the
crucial variable); id. at 416 (decrying the tendency to use college students in studies because
the "single and childless" state of students occludes the role of marriage and intimate com-
panionship in generating psychological conditions).
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were each trying individually to have it all. 63 Such an arrangement gets
stronger if the commitment is harder to abandon, but it may not inher-
ently need a license from the state. The experiment of abolishing mar-
riage would demonstrate which gains in health and wealth derive from
the legal category of marriage - a creation of the legislature - and
which from a long-term dyadic commitment, rooted in contract. At the
moment the two types of marital gains - those that derive from legal
favoritism, and those that derive from the relationship itself - get
tangled together."6 Policymakers must acknowledge that legal favorit-
ism is an artifice, a construct that new artifices can supersede.
3. Happiness as Policy
Partisans invoke happiness as a reason to adopt legislative changes
in support of marriage. Jeremy Bentham did indeed speak of happi-
ness as the goal of legislation,165 but few of his successors have hewed
to a consistent use of this term or its synonyms as a guide to policy."6
They will sometimes root legislative choices in the satisfaction of indi-
vidual preferences, and on other occasions ignore or even obstruct
these desires.'67 As legal scholars - a group broad enough to include
scholars ranging from historians to game theorists - have demon-
strated, the law will proscribe various behaviors that give individuals
pleasure or satisfaction: hate crimes, polluting of air and water, preda-
tory pricing, and aggressive panhandling, among many others.1" It is a
truism of the criminal law that antisocial behaviors cause more unhap-
piness than happiness, but legislative prohibitions remain valid even
when they inflict more misery than they prevent or remedy.169 Happi-
163. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111, at 25-27. I return briefly to the specializa-
tion hypothesis below. See infra note 176 and accompanying text.
164. See Dorian Solot & Marshall Miller, What The Case for Marriage Doesn't Want
You to Know, at http://www.unmarried.org/case.html.
165. See BENTHAM, supra note 43, at 34.
166. See generally David Dolinko, The Perils of Welfare Economics, 97 Nw. U. L. REV.
351, 364-84 (2002) (critiquing "well-being," a concept now used to update Bentham's "hap-
piness," as circular and incoherent).
167. See Bix, supra note 110, at 7-8.
168. I elaborate in Anita Bernstein, Reciprocity, Utility, and the Law of Aggression, 54
VAND. L. REV. 1, 1-18 (2001).
169. Two examples of such legislation are laws proscribing oral and anal sexual acts,
struck down only recently as unconstitutional, see Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S.Ct. 2472 (2003),
and laws restricting the sale of liquor on Sunday, see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-91(d)
(2003). For an account of sodomy laws as a source of grief and anxiety, see Jeremy Quittner,
Awaiting Judgment Day, ADVOCATE, Mar. 4, 2003, at 48, 52. The article quotes activist
Paula Ettelbrick: sodomy laws "lend support to the stigma and discrimination that lesbians
and gay men face - and that allows judges to say you are a criminal and you have no rights."
Id.; see also Randy E. Barnett, Bad Trip: Drug Prohibition and the Weakness of Public Pol-
icy, 103 YALE L.J. 2593, 2607 (1994) (noting that Indiana and Wyoming once criminalized
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ness does not of itself dictate the content of the law, and references to
happiness do not conclude an analysis of what the law ought to advo-
cate or compel.
To put the point more concretely, the same social-science-based,
utilitarian vantage point that urges individuals to marry has other hap-
piness-related advice to give, but partisans withhold these insights
from their list of recommendations. Dorian Solot and Marshall Miller
mention two examples: married couples without children claim to be
happier than married couples with children, and women with college
educations are more likely to divorce than non-college-educated
women.7 ° The "case for marriage" does not tell Americans to forsake
having children, nor discourage women from attending college. Yet an
individual motivated to seek happiness by playing the percentages -
someone seeking maximum returns on "sex, health [and] wealth," if
not children too, as Waite and Gallagher counsel - would wish to
know which choices correlate with which outcomes.71 No more com-
mitted to "happiness" than are most other utilitarian policymakers,
these partisans have cherry-picked what they like from the evidence
and discarded the rest.
4. Winners and Losers
Gaps in welfare between married and unmarried persons may not
necessarily commend marriage; they may signal bigotry and injustice.
Take for example one of the biggest statistical effects of marriage:
"The wage premium married men receive is one of the most well-
documented phenomena in social science," write Waite and
Gallagher.72 Marriage partisans perceive this effect as benign. Married
men must be more productive and more likely to show up at work so-
aiding or encouraging "masturbation or self-pollution"). Perhaps such prohibitions make
people happy, especially if one takes seriously the notion of shoring up public morals as a
source of happiness. The number of people that such laws make unhappy, however, or the
quantity of unhappiness that they cause, is almost certainly greater, even if the law is only
occasionally enforced. The principle that legislation retains validity until it is repealed or
nullified permits an unhappiness-inducing law to remain in place long after persons made
happy by its passage have died or become indifferent to the law; this delay is another source
of misfit between legislation and happiness.
170. Dorian Solot & Marshall Miller, Marriage-Only Forces Don't Help Today's Fami-
lies, at http://www.unmarried.org/marriage-project-sojoumer.html.
171. See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111, at 191.
172. Id. at 99.
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ber and on time, perhaps spurred by their role as providers."3 A man
who aspires to succeed in his career is in want of a wife.'74
The same data, however, support darker speculation. Just as labor-
market demographers have found that American men are overpaid at
work and women are underpaid - in other words, that men's wages
reveal a premium unexplained by any variable other than gender"' -
they could similarly conclude that employers overpay married men at
the expense of single men. Perhaps wage setters prefer married men
because they feel more comfortable with them and harbor unfounded
prejudices against single men.'76 Perhaps .vage-earning married men
take advantage of their wives - Waite and Gallagher describe wives
as career counselors and support systems for hard-working husbands77
- and therefore reap an enlarged share of wages, an unjust enrich-
ment at the wives' expense, for which wives are often uncompensated
at divorce. Perhaps single men find their singleness depressing, not of
itself but because of societal prejudices against it, and work less
productively as a consequence. Perhaps not. The point is that
differences in welfare between unmarried and married people can be
attributed to malevolent antecedents as easily as to benign ones. Such
173. Id. at 99-104. Married fathers of young children have particularly good attendance
records at work. ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD: WHY THE MOST
IMPORTANT JOB IN THE WORLD IS THE LEAST VALUED 25 (2001).
174. "It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good
fortune must be in want of a wife." JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE 1 (Adelphi ed.,
1930) (1813).
175. See Anita Bernstein, Engendered by Technologies, 80 N.C. L. REV. 1, 87 (2001)
(summarizing evidence from the Department of Labor and the Council of Economic Advis-
ers). For more scathing commentary, see Richard Goldstein, The Myth of Progress,
VILLAGE VOICE, Mar. 12, 2003, at 55. Goldstein faults the Bush administration for reducing
the federal government's ongoing studies of the wage gap and adds that "[i]f it's tempting
to believe women are doing just fine, perhaps that's because so many guys hold to this
idea." Id.
176. One study finds this hypothesis more plausible than the specialization hypothesis to
explain the wage gap between married and single men - because, as it turns out, married
and single men spend similar amounts of time on "home production" work. This study also
finds the favoritism hypothesis more plausible than the hypothesis of "the selection of more
productive men into marriage." Joni Hersch & Leslie S. Stratton, Household Specialization
and the Male Marriage Wage Premium, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 78, 93 (2000).
Organizational economics identifies a principal-agent problem that causes firms to inflict
or suffer harms because their agents, especially managerial employees, pursue agendas in
conflict with those of the enterprise. See generally OLIVER WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS
OF GOVERNANCE 172 (1996) (identifying this problem as fundamental to the study of the
firm). As agents, managers have intervened in workers' choices to marry. See ALICE
KESSLER-HARRIS, IN PURSUIT OF EQUALITY: WOMEN, MEN, AND THE QUEST FOR
ECONOMIC CITIZENSHIP IN 20TH-CENTURY AMERICA 47 (2001) (describing a 1914 program
at Ford Motor Company that awarded significant extra pay to various workers, most of them
married men, and that categorically excluded single men under age twenty-two).
177. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111, at 104-05,118-20.
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differences by themselves do not support a wholesale advocacy of
marriage.
III. TOWARD MORE HONEST BOOKKEEPING: COUNTING THE
DETRIMENTS OF STATE-SPONSORED MARRIAGE
As we have seen, the utilitarian "case" invites onlookers to con-
sider the question of whether society is better off with or without
state-sponsored marriage. If societal benefits of marriage justify the
decision to expand and buttress this institution, as partisans contend,
then comparable societal detriments would justify the decision to re-
treat from marriage and make it weaker. Only a tendentious version of
bookkeeping chooses to count the good news, such as increased life
expectancy of married persons, and write off the bad news, a portion
of which I discuss in this Part. Here my project is not to tally up the
aggregate costs and benefits of marriage, which defy computation and
reduce to disputes about values. Instead, this Part widens the ledger,
adding relevant variables - both monetary and nonmonetary - in
order to make the utilitarian inquiry more complete.17
178. Cf. Brauer, supra note 42 ("As an economist, I ask that we all consider, even if the
administration does not, the total bill to be paid.").
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The United States government subsidizes marriage through trans-
fer payments and other supports that are not means tested. These
payments constitute a reward that taxpayers as a group bestow on a
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class of individuals based solely on these persons' being, or having
been, married.
My claim that such transfer payments constitute "detriments"
compels me to declare my premises. 179 I would mention six. The first is
that the need for government spending is ongoing and constant:
money spent on transfer payments, or forgone by the decision to cre-
ate some exception to tax, must be recouped by other means. Budget
cuts would eliminate this need for recoupment, but for simplicity's
sake I presume fixed expenditures. Second, government capture of
revenues is a good thing; taxation, in this view, is not "theft."" 8 Third,
the government needs a good reason to extend favorable monetary
terms to a particular set of individuals. For example, deciding to cease
taxing stock-dividend income is proper, according to this view, if the
government has a goal it can state convincingly (increasing the pool of
capital available for investment, perhaps), but improper if no such goal
emerges.'81 Fourth, tax rules affect the quantity of revenue that the
state takes in: I deny that the tax code is infinitely manipulable by
well-counseled individuals. Fifth, the existence of antecedent legal
categories and consequences influences the content of tax legislation.
Whereas, in principle, tax law could contain infinite variety and ex-
perimentation, preexisting concepts limit the effect of imagination.
Sixth, transparency is good and opacity is bad. When these stipulations
are granted, marriage becomes a source of direct fiscal detriment, as
well as of various benefits, to the American public. 82
179. Readers and workshop audiences surprised me by finding this claim more ques-
tionable and objectionable than anything else in this Article. (I had assumed that exploring a
'radical' abolition thesis would offend, but apparently it didn't.) The criticisms vary; I note
them below as they arise. See infra notes 181-182. One notion that these commentators share
is that the taxing and spending of revenues is a struggle among interest groups rather than an
exercise in applied justice. Because no group has an a priori entitlement to money, it be-
comes absurd to speak of the "benefits" or "detriments" of any distributional outcome.
180. "Taxation as theft" gets an airing in J.R. Kearl, Do Entitlements Imply that Taxa-
tion is Theft?, 7 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 74, 74-81 (1977). Kearl concludes that the answer is no.
For arguments that taxation is illegitimate, see Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, Book Review,
Epstein's Takings Doctrine and the Public-Goods Problem, 65 TEXAS L. REV. 1233, 1242
(1987). Hummel summarizes the view that "natural rights" require "the taxless society." Id.;
see also ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 169 (1974) ("Taxation of earn-
ings from labor is on a par with forced labor.").
181. My colleague Bill Carney points out correctly that here I neglect interest group
theories of public choice. My stance is judgmental: I do not believe that all duly enacted laws
are equally sound or wise. Put another way, I mean to distinguish good from bad legislation,
recognizing that the latter kind of lawmaking does occur.
182. Some readers of this sentence note that state-sponsored marriage does not itself
cause the state to forgo revenue; instead, legislation that recognizes marriage effects this
consequence. This criticism is true enough, but I am making a simpler point: "Imagine
there's no marriage." See supra note 19 and text accompanying note 40 (noting Patricia
Cain's article of that title). What then? Among other effects, the state would collect more
money in taxes. If state-sponsored marriage were abolished, legislators could revise the tax
code. Right now, the subsidy forgoes revenue.
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1. Social Security Income
The federal government disburses Social Security transfer pay-
ments on the basis of marriage, and not only on the basis of need.1 83
Persons eligible for Social Security income are also eligible for
Medicare. Given that financially secure people are more likely to be
married than poor people,1'8 government policies that allot public
funds to individuals on the basis of marriage tend to subsidize the well-
off at the expense of the less prosperous. Social Security becomes a
primary detriment of state-sponsored marriage, then, because of its
regressive effects (and the lack of a rationale to support transfers from
poorer to richer persons).
2. Income Tax Revenue Foregone
A short survey of the federal tax consequences of state-sponsored
marriage - omitting comparable effects on state income tax reve-
nues18 - reveals various negative impacts to the fisc. Income taxation
is the kind of tax with the most pronounced marriage-related conse-
quences; estate and gift tax revenues are also reduced by the recogni-
tion of taxpayers as married.
In 1948, the United States took the eccentric step of creating a
marital joint tax return, recognizing the married couple as a single tax-
paying entity at their election.186 Married couples need not file a joint
return, but almost all married individuals who file tax returns choose
183. 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2000). The entitlement is known formally as the Old Age, Survi-
vors, and Disability Insurance Program. I use "Social Security" because this term is simpler
and more familiar, and for my purposes will cause no confusion.
184. See supra notes 149-152 and accompanying text.
185. About four-fifths of the states impose income taxes on their residents, generally
following the Internal Revenue Code's definition of marital status. Kristian D. Whitten,
Section Three of the Defense of Marriage Act: Is Marriage Reserved to the States?, 26
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 419, 452 (1999). Domestic partners in California may not file joint
income tax returns, so long as the federal government holds to its current definition of mar-
riage. CAL. FAM. CODE § 297.5(g) (West 2004) ("[D]omestic partners shall use the same
filing status as is used on their federal income tax returns, or that would have been used had
they filed federal income tax returns."). In Vermont, however, parties to a civil union enjoy
the same status with respect to Vermont income tax "as if federal income tax law recognized
a civil union in the same manner as Vermont law." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 5812 (2003).
186. Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1389,
1412-14 (1975); see also Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A
Guide for the Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 4 & n.15 (2000) (explaining that of the twenty-
seven member nations of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
the United States joins only seven other countries in providing for a joint marital return; the
other nineteen nations impose income taxes separately on spouses) [hereinafter Zelenak,
Doing Something About Marriage Penalties]. A 2001 government report in Canada reaf-
firmed the Canadian choice to tax individuals rather than families. LAW COMM'N OF
CANADA, BEYOND CONJUGALITY 38-43 (2001).
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to do so because the joint return almost always reduces their tax li-
abilities.'87 Contemporary justifications of the joint return focus on
what Lawrence Zelenak has called "couples neutrality" - the princi-
ple that each couple should be treated the same as another couple with
the same income.1" Without artificial intervention from the joint re-
turn and without tinkering to combat "the marriage penalty," a couple
made up of one high-earning spouse and one spouse earning little or
no wage income (for example, a $120,000 husband married to a $0
wife) would pay much more in taxes than a couple of two middle-
earners with the same total income (each earning $60,000, say) be-
cause of the brackets that characterize progressive taxation. 9
Couples neutrality is an extraordinary concept, no less for having
been taken for granted."9 Professor Zelenak concisely notes the
stakes: "There is no way to design an income tax which (1) is progres-
sive, (2) achieves marriage neutrality (no marriage bonuses or penal-
ties), and (3) achieves couples neutrality."'' No more than two of the
three aspects can exist in any system. Forced to choose, the Internal
Revenue Code has clung to the least justified, and least justifiable, of
the three desiderata. The principle of progressivity rests on a well-
crafted philosophical and political base and enjoys wide support.'9g
The principle of what might be called "marriage neutrality" has re-
ceived extensive endorsement in an array of statutes and judicial deci-
sions.193 No comparable extrinsic source of support buttresses couples
neutrality. No groundswell of enthusiasm for this kind of neutrality
supported the invention of the joint return in 1948; couples neutrality
was a byproduct rather than a purpose of tax reform.194
Negative consequences to the fisc have followed. A continual hue
and cry about penalties to married persons notwithstanding, the joint
return enriches more taxpayers than it burdens. During 1996, the most
187. See EDWARD MCCAFFERY, TAXING WOMEN 16 (1997).
188. Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties, supra note 186, at 4.
189. MCCAFFERY, supra note 187, at 19-20.
190. Bittker, supra note 186, at 1438 (arguing that the separate returns proposal is "as-
tonishing" because it violates "equality in taxes between married couples with the same
income"); see also SYLVIA ANN HEWLETT & CORNEL WEST, THE WAR AGAINST PARENTS
243 (1998) (insisting that "the homemaker penalty" in federal income taxation violates cou-
ples neutrality).
191. Lawrence Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, 67 S. CAL. L. REV 339, 342
(1994) [hereinafter Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax].
192. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax
Movement: A Typical Male Reaction, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 504-18 (1987) (expounding on
philosophical arguments for progressive taxation).
193. See Crea, supra note 32; Duncan, supra note 32; Jaff, supra note 19; supra notes 58-
60 and accompanying text.
194. Zelenak, Marriage and the Income Tax, supra note 191, at 359-60.
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recent year covered in federal reports, the government lost $4 billion
that it would have collected if married persons were obliged to file
separate returns.9 '
3. Gift and Estate Tax Revenue Foregone
"When a well-heeled spouse transfers property to the other spouse
during the marriage," writes family-law scholar David Chambers, "the
transfer is not subject to the federal gift tax that would apply to gifts to
others, including the donor's children."'" A spouse can transfer assets
to another spouse on divorce without incurring a gift or capital gains
tax obligation."9 "And when a spouse dies," Chambers continues,
"bequests to the other spouse are not taxed under federal estate tax
laws."' 98 Intraspousal wealth transfers yield less tax revenue to the
government than do comparable transfers between persons who are
not married to each other.
4. Offsets
Against these primary detriments, an honest bookkeeper must
count the utility of marriage to the public fisc. Examples abound. Even
though the joint return causes the federal government to take in less
revenue than it would without one, filing jointly as a married couple
can result in greater tax liability than filing separately as a pair of un-
related adults."'9 Gift and estate tax revenue lost to intramarital trans-
fers, though not offset, is frequently recouped in large part when the
widow or widower dies."° Criteria to receive transfer payments take
into account the income of a spouse, in some cases disqualifying an
indigent person from making a claim on public funds. Marriage can
rescue indigents, especially women, from poverty, and can prevent an
individual from becoming a public charge. These quantities are hard to
count but certainly exist. One can say, however, that the current state
of transfer-payment policy makes marriage more of a detriment than a
195. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE
FEDERAL INCOME TAX 1 (June 1997), available at ftp://ftp.cbo.gov/Oxx/doc7/marriage.pdf.
196. Chambers, supra note 87, at 474.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 195, at 1-6.
200. I thank my colleague Jeffrey Pennell for reminding me of this point.
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benefit to the public fisc: means-based welfare payments have
shrunk,201 and marriage-inducement payments continue to rise.
B. Secondary Detriments
In contrast to the primary effects of state-sponsored marriage,
which relate directly to the public fisc as a matter of statutory law, sec-
ondary detriments come from regulated activities in which statutory
law takes a strong regulatory interest, but does not expressly decree
particular consequences. These secondary effects result indirectly from
governmental recognition of marriage. Their price tag includes non-
monetary detriments and costs to individuals who do not comply with
a marriage-favoring posture in the law, as well as monetary
effects.
1. Private Insurance and Pension Benefits
State-sponsored marriage establishes a convention for the distribu-
tion of private-sector employment benefits, of which health and life
insurance are the most significant. To the extent that employers would
have chosen not to provide this insurance but feel compelled to follow
this convention, spouses receive benefits that they would not receive
but for the fact of their state-sponsored marriage. And to the extent
that persons covered as spouses rather than employees obtain eco-
nomic benefit from this coverage, fellow policyholders underwrite this
benefit, providing an unexamined and unjustified transfer on the basis
of marriage.
The law abets this underwriting of marriage in several ways. Fore-
most is the Internal Revenue Code position that the furnishing of in-
surance benefits to employees' spouses does not constitute a taxable
transfer of income.202 Several states have also codified the convention
that spouses are entitled to workplace-based health insurance benefits,
compelling employers to insure workers' spouses when they insure the
workers themselves, if the spouses are uninsured.2 3 Insurance law
sometimes frowns on permitting any individual to ensure the life of an
201. On the shrinking of means-based welfare spending, see Ralph Scharnau, Several
Factors Undermine Success of Welfare Reform, TELEGRAPH HERALD (Dubuque, Iowa),
Feb. 3,2002, at A19.
202. I.R.C. § 105(b) (2000); Cain, supra note 19, at 40 n.75; Chambers, supra note 87, at
474. By contrast, the furnishing of insurance benefits to domestic partners is taxable to the
recipient. See Interview by HRC FamilyNet with Lara Schwartz, Senior Counsel, Human
Rights Campaign, HRC Expert Talks About Taxes, Other Financial Issues Facing GLBT
Families, http://www.hrc.org/Content/ContentGroups/News_- Releases/20031/HRCExpert_
Talks_AboutTaxes,_OtherFinancialIssuesFacingGLBTFamilies.htm (Apr. 8, 2003).
203. Chambers, supra note 87, at 484.
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unrelated adult, a stance that can wreak havoc in the financial lives of
couples who cannot marry.2 These stances in the law subsidize mar-
riage at the expense of employers and other individuals who partici-
pate in insurance pools. In addition to intervening in the distribution
of insurance benefits and also decreeing, or at least facilitating, trans-
fers to individuals based on their marital status, the law has often de-
clined to enforce vigorously its rules that prohibit insurers from dis-
criminating on the basis of marriage.2 5
Regarding "qualified" pensions (meaning pensions that are eligible
for tax deferral and employer deductions), federal law compels each
employer to pay an annuity to the spouse of a participant worker when
the participant retires or dies. 2' This annuity is designed to pay "the
actuarial equivalent of 50% of the participant's vested benefit, con-
verted to the form of a lifetime annuity. '27 Spouses receive guaran-
teed pension benefits even when the retirement plan is of the "defined
contribution" type, now ascendant over the "defined benefit" type.2°a
In the "defined contribution" plan, which includes 401(k) accounts,
the participant is often free to withdraw the amount she has accrued,
or use it as collateral for a personal loan. Despite this degree of par-
204. The "insurable interest" requirement, which originated in common law, has been
codified in about half the states. Franklin L. Best, Jr., Defining Insurable Interests in Lives, 22
TORT & INS. L.J. 104, 105 & n.9 (1986). Under this doctrine, a policy issued to a person
lacking an insurable interest in the contingency is an illegal contract that may give rise to tort
liability. Id. One anecdote on point is provided in E.J. GRAFF, WHAT IS MARRIAGE FOR? 40
(1999). Graff recounts how she and her partner faced a home mortgage lender that required
the two women to insure each other's lives; when Graff and her partner tried to comply, they
learned that insurers would not recognize an insurable interest between two "unrelated"
women. Id.
205. Jennifer Jaff writes that as a single woman she was turned down for renter's insur-
ance in Miami because the insurer required policyholders to declare that some responsible
person would stay home in the insured residence during the day, notwithstanding a Florida
law prohibiting marital-status discrimination. Jaff, supra note 19, at 214. Whether Florida
regulators did not deem the insurer's policy to be related to marital status (after all, the per-
son trapped inside the house did not have to be a lawful wife) or simply did not care about
the company policy is unknown; what is known, beyond Florida, is that insurance law pro-
hibiting discrimination is sparsely enforced. See H. Jane Lehman, Tests Uncover Rampant
Bias in Home Insurance Process, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 15, 1995, § 16, at 1 (reporting results of
undercover testing); Gregory D. Squires, Let the Sun Shine In on Property Insurance, NAT'L
UNDERWRITER, Sept. 3, 2001, at 25 ("State regulators have simply not regulated in this
area.").
206. I.R.C. § 401(a)(11)(A)(ii) (2003). The only exception to this requirement arises
when the spouse consents to an alternative type of payment. Jonathan Barry Forman, Whose
Pension is It Anyway? Protecting Spousal Rights in a Privatized Social Security System, 76
N.C. L. REV. 1653, 1666-67 (1998).
207. David A. Pratt, Nor Rhyme Nor Reason: Simplifying Defined Contribution Plans,
49 BuFF. L. REV. 741, 835 (2001).
208. On the rise of "defined contribution" over "defined benefit," see Michael J. Collins,
Reviving Defined Benefit Plans: Analysis and Suggestions for Reform, 20 VA. TAX REV. 599,
604, 608-09 (2001).
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ticipant freedom, the participant's spouse can count on an annuity
when the participant dies or retires.2"
For an unmarried participant, by contrast, the benefits of a quali-
fied pension dwindle. An unmarried participant may designate a bene-
ficiary to receive a post-retirement benefit. If she dies before she
retires, however, nobody collects an annuity. Under this scheme, man-
dated by federal law, employers and unmarried workers underwrite
benefits for spouses.21°
2. Religion as a Shield
American law occasionally allows individuals and entities to use
religion to achieve immunity from legal liability. Behaviors otherwise
prohibited - that is, elsewhere identified as detrimental - become
acceptable in a religious context. Because of their partial exemption
from antidiscrimination mandates, religious institutions can practice
discrimination on the basis of marital status while enjoying the support
of law.2 '
Marriage- and religion-related detriments that the law condones
include discrimination against employees on the basis of martial
status 212 and breaches of religiously based marital contracts. The para-
digm contracts of this kind are the Jewish ketubot that give a husband
the unilateral power to initiate a religious divorce, and permit him to
withhold it from his wife 313 The treatment of religion in American law
continues to bolster detriments related to marital status.
21 4
209. See generally Forman, supra note 206, at 1669-71.
210. For an account of one unmarried worker's frustration with this state of pension law,
see Michelle Conlin, Unmarried America, Bus. WK., Oct. 20,2003, at 106.
211. If state-sponsored marriage were abolished, this opportunity would not go away:
religious institutions could discriminate on the basis of nongovernmental marriage. State-
sponsored marriage does, however, facilitate this tendency: it makes marital status easy to
look up and straightforward to ascribe.
212. See Little v. Wuehl, 929 F.2d 944, 945 (9th Cir. 1991) (holding that the religious
exemption to Title VII permitted a Catholic school to refuse to renew the contract of a
Protestant teacher who remarried in defiance of church teaching). In Dolter v. Wahlert High
School, 483 F. Supp. 266, 271 (N.D. Iowa 1980), the plaintiff schoolteacher was fired by her
Catholic institutional employer when she became pregnant out of wedlock. The court agreed
to hear the claim only as one of sex discrimination, not marital-status discrimination. Id.
213. See Aflalo v. Aflalo, 685 A.2d 523, 525 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1996) (refusing, on
First Amendment grounds, to compel a husband to give his wife a get, or Jewish divorce,
thereby leaving the wife unable to remarry within her community).
214. The rise of federal faith-based initiatives has diverted money from child-support
programs to religious organizations "so they can promote marriage." Siobhan McDonough,
Religious Groups Get Federal Grants to Promote Marriage, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 3, 2003, § 1, at
20. Recipients of these expenditures see their efforts as benign, but all marriage-promotion
efforts inherently contain a detrimental aspect, even if it is nothing worse than the lecturing
or hectoring of a captive audience. The religious identity of those who receive funding for
faith-based programs hinders scrutiny of what they do with their expenditures - a condition
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3. Frustrating Worthy Creditors
Marriage, as a shelter of assets, shields deserving and undeserving
debtors alike. An observer can speculate infinitely about the worthi-
ness or unworthiness of creditors whose attempts to collect on a debt
are frustrated by marriage-based shields like the opportunity to title
assets in a spouse's name. Who deserves the asset more, the creditor
or the married debtor? One cannot know. One can know, however,
that legal shelters protecting individuals based on their marriage,
rather than another trait more clearly pertinent to their status as debt-
ors, can hinder the optimal collection and payment of debt.
An example is the use of tenancy by the entirety to obstruct the
collection of child support payments. In the name of marriage, a delin-
quent parent can use tenancy by the entirety to prevent a seizure of
property to pay for the support of children from a prior marriage or
relationship. One commentator has found the problem nontrivial in
practice, 215 notwithstanding the modern decline of tenancy by the en-
tirety and the supposed panoply of remedies available to enforce child
support obligations.2 6 Commercial creditors can be more or less de-
serving. Favoring delinquent obligors over their children, who are enti-
tled to support, however, privileges one type of law-based family
relation over a different law-based family relation that inherently con-
tains more vulnerability.
4. Offsets
The secondary detriments of marriage complement a set of gains,
which take form as liberties. Marriage is a site of condoned inequality,
but when enforced as government policy, equality comes at the ex-
pense of freedom.217 Freedom of contract and freedom of religion off-
set (and may justify) some secondary detriments of marriage. Freeing
employees to reject insurance coverage for their spouses as well as to
that turned Congress against faith-based initiatives, compelling President Bush to install
them by executive order. See id.
215. Robert D. Null, Note, Tenancy by the Entirety as an Asset Shield: An Unjustified
Safe Haven for Delinquent Child Support Obligors, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 1057, 1090-93 (1995).
216. On the decline of tenancy by the entirety, see supra Part I.C.5. Several authors
discuss the range of measures available to deter and punish child support arrears. See Jillian
Lloyd, When Do Stiff Penalties for Deadbeat Parents Go Too Far?, CHRISTIAN SC.
MONITOR, Mar. 25, 1999, at 2 (noting trend toward criminalizing nonpayment of child sup-
port); John Wagner, New Law Allows Crackdown on Child Support, NEWS & OBSERVER
(Raleigh), Dec. 31, 1995, at B1 (describing measures taken in North Carolina, including
"most wanted" posters featuring parents in arrears, withheld driver's licenses, and expanded
wage garnishing).




collect it without tax liability creates options - that is, liberty - for
these workers.
Yet along with its complement of secondary gains, the category of
secondary detriments gives reason for concern about transparency.
Secondary detriments are veiled. Even sophisticated adults seldom
know the origins of such everyday truths as the "natural" link between
marriage and insurance; even judges become vexed over the question
of how much freedom a religious enterprise should enjoy from the rig-
ors of antidiscrimination law.218 The force of law underwrites these
secondary effects, but in an only vaguely estimable quantity. Because
they partake of both private-sector prerogatives and law-sponsored
encouragement of particular choices, these consequences can escape
accountability in a way that fiddling with, say, "the marriage penalty"
- a clearly primary maneuver - never achieves. In order to compare
offsets against detriments, those who make and observe policy need a
sharper sense of how partial regulation makes marriage-favoring out-
comes appear spontaneous, or derived from the neutral workings of
freedom.
C. Tertiary Detriments
Norms are the best-studied example of quasi-legal sources of
regulation that, though neither codified nor judicially decreed, never-
theless predict and partially govern behavior.2"9 Marriage-related
norms that have detrimental effects fall into the tertiary category be-
cause the law neither causes them directly, as is the case with primary
detriments, nor facilitates them through partial regulatory involve-
ment, as is the case with secondary detriments. Of the three categories,
"tertiary" is the least precise, the most debatable, and the furthest re-
moved from quantifiable financial consequences.
The tertiary detriments of marriage can emerge only after one de-
termines what to compare to what. To those who look at marriage as a
legal category, adverse effects emerge with particular clarity when one
contrasts heterosexual couplings unrecognized by the state, on the one
218. See Jane Rutherford, Equality as the Primary Constitutional Value: The Case for
Applying Employment Discrimination Laws to Religion, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1049, 1128
(1996).
219. Norms are everywhere. In our context of marriage, for instance, all but two presi-
dents of the United States, James Buchanan and Grover Cleveland, followed a norm that a
man must be married at the time of the campaign in order to win this office. Michael
Farquhar, Hail to the Chiefs, WASH. POST, Feb. 18, 2002, at C16 (noting that Buchanan never
married and Cleveland had not yet married when he was elected). Other norms say that the
president should not have ever been divorced, nor have married a divorced woman; he is
also not supposed to have extramarital sex while in office. Though flouted by
Presidents Reagan, Ford, Kennedy, and Clinton respectively (and perhaps by others), these
norms retain some force.
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hand, with state-sponsored marriage, on the other. State-sponsored
marriage has several deleterious consequences when compared with
informal pairing. By privileging one type of union over another, 220 it
stigmatizes cohabitation as less privileged. It makes a breakup from
the sanctioned union more difficult, expensive, and slow. As we have
seen elsewhere, distinct benefits undeniably offset these detriments,
but the costs nevertheless should not be overlooked in a quasi-
utilitarian celebration of marriage.
Cohabitation is not the only alternative to marriage; many adults
neither cohabit nor marry. Unpartnered and same-sex-partnered per-
sons also get hurt by tertiary detriments. State sponsorship establishes
the gender-dimorphous dyad as the preferred way to arrange one's
private life. 21 An uncounted, unaudited, barely questioned, and virtu-
ally sacred legal stance in favor of marriage - a subsidy that as we
have seen causes billions of dollars to change hands each year - sends
a message of privilege that extends beyond money. "It's a [heterosex-
ual] couples' world," the discontented say.22 Laments from single
adults, homosexually or bisexually oriented persons, and husbands or
wives who feel social pressure locking them inside miserable marriages
are familiar to the point of clichd. Not fair, we hear, to deprive the
unmarried of marriage-related privileges. 223 Unhappiness about ideo-
logical subsidy is, indeed, far more prevalent than unhappiness about
any financial perks. Such nonmonetary inequity, though hard to meas-
ure and count, is amenable to the quasi-utilitarian reckoning that the
"case for marriage" invites. Ideological subsidy is a good investment if
society is better off with it: single persons, homosexually and bisexu-
ally oriented persons, and persons who resent the pressure favoring
marriage may feel that the ideology persecutes them, but the gains of
favoring that which is advantageous to the public can outweigh the
social losses of their distress. It is wrong, however, to proceed with a
pro-marriage legislative agenda as if these losses and detriments did
not exist.
Like their cousins of the primary and secondary type, tertiary det-
riments contain built-in offsets. What you call stigmatization could be
to me a principled preference for something good over something bad.
220. See generally Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, Marry Me, Bill: The Case for
Keeping Marriage (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (comparing cohabi-
tation with marriage).
221. See supra Part II.C.2 (describing favoritism).
222. For invocations of this phrase, see Lisa Kochanowski, Group Offers Outlet for
Widows, Widowers, S. BEND TRIB., Mar. 31, 2002, at Cl; Kim Ode, Divorce Might Not Be as
Contagious as We Think, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Sept. 8, 2002, at E4.
223. Miller, supra note 116 (recounting whining); see also Jaff, supra note 19 (arguing
that marital status should be a source of neither benefits nor detriments).
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Slowed and burdensome parting for some equals a brake on reckless
impulses for others. The point, again, is not to take a measure of mar-
riage, but rather to survey what a reputable measurer would want to
count. The following discussion considers a few among many ill ef-
fects.
1. The Gender Gap in Gains from Marriage
Just as bylines identify women as relatively skeptical about mar-
riage and men relatively enthusiastic about it,224 wives report that they
do not enjoy their married lives as much as their husbands do.2" The
"case for marriage" prefers to put the point more positively: both men
and women benefit from marriage, but men benefit more. The most
dramatic gains of marriage redound to men as individuals, rather than
to women: men who marry win significantly higher income, much bet-
ter health, and longer life,226 but for women, the gains occasioned by
marrying are relatively modest, and the picture more mixed. The im-
proved health that married women enjoy is almost entirely a function
of money - specifically, their husbands' extra income and health in-
surance.227 Single women live longer after heart attacks than married
women.2" Many married women in the workforce fare poorly there:
divorced women earn more than both married and never-married
women, 229 and motherhood, a condition that frequently accompanies
women's marriage, depresses women's wages and job opportunities.' 3
Getting married reduces depression for men but not for women,231 and
the question of whether married women or single women suffer more
224. For a citation of classic feminist criticisms of marriage, see Martha Chamallas, Con-
sent, Equality, and the Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 777, 788 n.49
(1988). See also supra note 19 (noting that most authors who criticize or attack marriage are
women). Paeans to marriage come more often from men than women, and gay men, includ-
ing David Chambers, William Eskridge, and Andrew Sullivan, are noted for their eloquent
praise of marriage as an institution that should be opened to same-sex couples. Of course,
many women are very grateful for, and admiring of, marriage.
225. HACKER, supra note 28, at 28 (noting wives' greater discontent); Karen S.
Peterson, Why Men Drag Their Feet Down the Aisle, USA TODAY, June 26, 2002, at 8D
("Women often see marriage as a better deal for men than for women, providing a man with
steady sex, a caretaker for the kids, a social planner, a domestic servant, and a second -
sometimes larger - paycheck.").
226. Ken Dempsey, Who Gets the Best Deal from Marriage: Women or Men?, 38 J. Soc.
91(2002).
227. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111, at 60.
228. Steve Steinberg, After Heart Attack, Can Kindness Kill?, USA TODAY, Nov. 20,
2002, at D10.
229. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111, at 107 n.28.
230. Ann Crittenden estimates she lost a million dollars in wage income because she
became a mother. See CRITrENDEN, supra note 173, at 87-109.
231. WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 111, at 70-71.
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from depression remains unresolved. Sticking with an unhappy mar-
riage seems to benefit men, but "[w]omen who stay in bad marriages
become depressed, exhibit lowered immune functioning and are more
likely to abuse alcohol than women who get out.
' ' 2
Marriage partisans acknowledge the gender gap between men's
and women's experiences of marriage, but insist that it does not hurt
their argument. Yes, they concede, marriage contains two halves.233 If
his were to thrive at the expense of hers, one might worry about the
goodness of the institution, they say; but as long as both men and
women benefit from marriage, why worry 3? 2' This stance is at odds
with widely held contemporary views of justice that propel the welfare
state to ameliorate distributional inequities, 235 and with utilitarianism
itself, the normative foundation that advocates have chosen to under-
lie their secular "case for marriage." Studies report that game-player
parties reject positive-sum bargains when they feel that other partici-
pants are taking advantage of them, an embarrassment to hardcore
utilitarianism sometimes explained as evincing "a taste for fairness."236
Sharply delineated gender differences favoring men over women in
any social practice bespeak a problem, not a policy cure-all.
With marriage, the problematic conditions are easy to see, not
buried under microeconomic simulations or abstract conceptions of
justice. Women gain wealth from marriage because they gain vicarious
access to the favored gender's paycheck. Their health improves be-
cause they are married to health insurance: their lower-paying jobs,
and their inferior access to employment-based medical insurance, keep
232. Stephanie Coontz, Marriage Can't Be the Only Accepted Commitment, NEWSDAY,
May 27,2001, at B8.
233. Sociologist Jessie Bernard won fame for saying that every marriage contains two
marriages, his and hers, and "hers" needs repair. BERNARD, supra note 145, at 1.
234. See David Popenoe, The Top Ten Myths of Marriage, National Marriage Project, at
http://marriage.rutgers.edu/Publications/pubmyths%20of%20marriage.htm (Mar. 2002)
(claiming that the gains are virtually equal for men and women because women gain signifi-
cant "financial advantages") [hereinafter Popenoe, The Top Ten Myths of Marriage].
235. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 278 (1971) (propounding an entitlement
to baseline support); see also NORMAN FROLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, CHOOSING
JUSTICE: AN EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL THEORY 58 (1992) (reporting find-
ings that most people would rather have average utility with a welfare floor than the oppor-
tunity to hold great gains without a floor); Maureen B. Cavanaugh, Democracy, Equality,
and Taxes, 54 ALA. L. REV. 415, 422-28 (2003) (defending redistribution).
236. See Ward Farnsworth, The Taste for Fairness, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1992, 1995
(2002) (quoting LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 21
(2002)). For elaboration in the context of marriage, see Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?, 84 VA. L. REV. 509, 590
(1998) (citing ERIC RASMUSEN, GAMES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO GAME
THEORY 229 (1989), and Alvin E. Roth, Bargaining Experiments, in THE HANDBOOK OF
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 253, 266-74 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995)). Wax
notes that the decision to divorce a spouse who insists on lopsided bargains may reflect an
independent "taste for equity." Id.
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them away from the health care resources given more generously to
working men. Unlike men, who earn more as married fathers
than as childless bachelors, women suffer a loss in wages when they
become parents - forcing them to choose, when they have children,
between straitened single motherhood and marriage-dependent wifely
sacrifice - 237 that is, if they have a choice: some women fail to attain
marriage even though they want it, and others get discarded by hus-
bands who no longer want them. 8 Such inequities are not obscure or
trivial. By initiating most divorces, despite (probably) knowing that
divorce is costly, women manifest a "taste for equity," which utilitari-
ans admit can outweigh the desire for gain. 39 If many women prefer
the hardships of "equity" to the goods of marriage, perhaps these
goods are insufficient to support marriage as policy.
2. Tertiary Consequences of Primary Detriments: Social Security and
Income Tax
Social Security subsidizes stay-at-home wives at the expense of
working wives. A married woman is entitled to benefits calculated on
a basis of half her husband's earnings.' Alternatively, if she too par-
ticipated in the labor market, she receives either the amount credited
to her own earnings or the amount credited to the stay-at-home share,
whichever is greater. Consequently, if during her years in the
workforce she did not outearn the "traditional" allotment, all of her
contributions (made in the form of Social Security taxes) go unrepaid.
Historians report that these rules were written with the explicit pur-
pose of keeping women home;24' regardless of their original purpose,
they perpetuate the incentive. The tradition of keeping women out
237. This phrasing omits two sources of gain for mothers: the utility of childrearing
(which is available to all mothers), and the benefits of sharing in a husband's income (avail-
able to mothers who are married to wage-earning men). These gains are significant, and may
help explain why most women become mothers despite the price, but they have already
taken up a lot of space in public discussion. Elise Bruhl, Motherhood and Contract: Always
Crashing in the Same Car, 9 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 191, 191-99 (2000) (noting extravagant
rhetorical homage to motherhood). For the sake of balance, I have buried the oft-stated
good news in the footnote, and placed the less-stated bad news in the text.
238. See HACKER, supra note 28, at 27 (noting that although wives initiate most di-
vorces, this generalization does not hold for older divorcing couples).
239. Wax, supra note 236, at 590.
240. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(2), (c)(3) (1994).
241. Alice Kessler-Harris, Designing Women and Old Fools: The Construction of the
Social Security Amendments of 1939, in U.S. HISTORY AS WOMEN'S HISTORY 101 (Linda K.
Kerber et al. eds., 1995).
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of the labor market is strengthened in a patriarchal view of the
provider.242
Encouraged to avoid the labor market, women are also encouraged
to stay in their marriages until death. When it comes time to receive
Social Security payments, widows collect one hundred percent of the
benefit that reflects their late husbands' contributions, but women
whose marriages ended in divorce collect no more than fifty percent,
and then only if they were married to the husband in question for at
least ten years. 243 This allotment puts a woman in a bind. If she stays at
home the way the Social Security system encourages women to do, she
risks losing significant benefits upon divorce (less than half of all mar-
riages that end in divorce make it to ten years). If she stays at work,
chances are her Social Security contributions will add up to no addi-
tional benefit for her. Meanwhile, much of her economic fate rides on
her husband's decision not to divorce her - a decision she cannot con-
trol, but can encourage through a pliant, he-comes-first marital atti-
tude (or, perhaps, through assurances that divorce will be costly
to him).
Tertiary detriments related to the Social Security treatment of
marriage inflict injury on the basis of race as well as gender. First,
African-American wives are more likely than white wives to have
worked outside the home for money;2" the subsidy of stay-at-home
wives redounds to the benefit of white couples and the detriment of
African Americans. Second, African Americans are more likely than
Caucasian Americans to be single.245 Social Security rules that reward
marriage, then, reward Caucasian taxpayers at the expense of African-
242. MCCAFFERY, supra note 187, at 193. But see Nada Eissa, Book Review, 37 J.
ECON. LITERATURE 683, 684-85 (1999) (criticizing McCaffery for ignoring the significant
minority of married women who earn more than their husbands).
243. 42 U.S.C. § 402(b) (2000); MCCAFFERY, supra note 187, at 97-98.
244. One study found that 63.2% of African-American wives were working outside the
home in 2000, compared to 59.8% of white wives. T. Shawn Taylor, Time Crunch Clobbers
Working Families, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., Sept. 18, 2002, at G1. The figure for African
Americans is probably too low, because African-American women take up informal, off-the-
books jobs more than do white women. See Alison Stein Wellner, The Two Worlds of
Women, FORECAST, Oct. 22, 2002, at 1. Earnings from informal employment are generally
not subject to Social Security payroll taxes, which means that the worker can take home
more of her wage, but also cannot benefit from her own contributions when she retires.
245. Jay D. Teachman et al., The Changing Demography of America's Families, 62 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 1234, 1236-39 (2000) (noting that African Americans are less likely than
Caucasians to marry at any point in their lives, to convert a nonmarital union into marriage,
and to remarry after divorce); id. at 1238 (reporting that in 1990, thirty-five percent of white
women aged forty to forty-four had experienced at least one divorce, whereas for African-
American women the figure was forty-five percent). The trend is growing stronger: of all
black women in their early forties, 58.3% were currently married in 1970, and 40.3% were
currently married in 2000. HACKER, supra note 28, at 160-61.
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American taxpayers.2' 6 Unsurprisingly, given this racial divide, transfer
payments to assist needy children and their caregivers are considered
pathological ("welfare as we know it"), 47 while transfer payments for
widowed and disabled persons stay respectable, a kind of insurance.
To those who say that African Americans can easily cross over to the
favored side by marrying, a sizeable literature responds that single
African Americans report sound reasons for refusing this option, or
are single for reasons other than choice.2'
Income tax rules also press women to comply with patriarchal tra-
ditions. Like many other values that invoke "neutrality," couples neu-
trality in income tax policy harbors a pointed political agenda. Focus-
ing on a couple rather than an individual as a taxpaying unit, the con-
cept encourages the spouses to live in a particular way qua couple. As
scholars have demonstrated, it is impossible for a tax system that re-
spects "couples neutrality" to avoid favoring either an egalitarian or a
traditional pattern of wage attribution within each marriage.249 The
246. See Conlin, supra note 210, at 106 (noting that "one out of every three black male
youths will pay for retirement benefits they will never see"). See generally Dorothy A.
Brown, The Abolition of Marriage Movement from a Tax Policy Perspective: Only Certain
Women Need Apply (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (pointing out
racial consequences of facially neutral federal spending policies).
247. In his 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton pledged to abolish "welfare as we
know it." Ross K. Baker, Nimble Presidents Can Change Views, Still Succeed in Long Run,
USA TODAY, Sept. 18,2003, at 21A.
248. See Edin, supra note 150; see also WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE TRULY
DISADVANTAGED 90-92 (1987) (evaluating African-American women's reasons for rejecting
marriage); Linda McClain, "Irresponsible" Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 339, 393-95
(1996) (summarizing "structural factors" that discourage marriage in both African-American
and lower-income communities).
249. One writer uses the alien-planet device to good effect here:
Imagine landing on the planet Ames, discovering that human life inhabits it, and that, like
Earth, two things are inevitable: death and taxes. Upon learning that the Amesians have an
income tax system, your first impulse is to examine it in the hope of discovering how the
Amesians live, how they think, and what they believe. In doing so, you learn the following.
The government pays male Amesians to marry females who do not work. When a female
Amesian who does work marries, by law her income is cut. In fact, the Amesian government
discourages her from working at all after marrying. By contrast, when a male marries, his in-
come is automatically increased. Perhaps most astonishing of all is the phenomenon in which
most female Amesians pay their husbands every year for the privilege of being married to
them, even when the female earns significantly less than her husband. Each year at tax time,
there is, in effect, a massive transfer of wealth from the married women in the population to
their husbands....
Later, after returning to Earth, lamenting your misfortune, and pondering the oddities of
the Amesian tax code, you still cannot believe that seemingly intelligent beings would devise
a tax system with such overt bias against females, one that departed so dramatically from
neutral principles. You decide to establish interplanetary communications and to ask the
Amesians why they chose a tax system with such an egregious impact on females. You gain
access to a government satellite, transmit your inquiry to the Amesians, and a few weeks
later, their reply arrives: "We got our tax system from you. It is a copy of your U.S. tax code.
We have been watching you Americans for years. As we study your society, we adopt some
of your more salient customs."
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couples-neutrality concept is not particularly neutral. For instance, it
presumes that husbands and wives pool their income - a gross over-
simplification of reality at best.250 Perhaps it is also a coercive intrusion
into domestic arrangements; attitudinal surveys report that men favor
marital pooling of income more than women do.25'
3. The Tax on Stepmothers' Resources
Within marriages that blend preexisting families, stepmotherhood
is a tough assignment. Fewer than twenty percent of young adult chil-
dren in stepfamilies feel close to their stepmothers, an unhappy out-
come that one observer attributes to the stepmother role leaving a
woman "caught in the middle, expected to be a nurturer of sometimes
difficult and suspicious children. '' 2 Stepmothers report significant dis-
content and frustration within their marriages, strains that frequently
coexist with financial strife. 3 Informal counterparts to stepmother-
hood, though perhaps equally trying, or more so, would be easier than
marriage to escape.
4. Detriments to Children
Paeans to the two-parent family have so filled public discussion 254
that one who undertakes the task of bookkeeping must go to some
trouble to count the ways that state-sponsored marriage can hurt chil-
dren. A two-parent household (containing original parents, that is,
rather than a stepparent) unmarred by rifts between the two adults is a
fine place to grow up - probably the best possible environment for a
child, all else being equal. But the "case for marriage" praises the insti-
tution categorically, not just the serene households that comprise a
fraction of all marriages. And the category of marriage includes varia-
tions that leave children worse off.
Two recurring patterns, neither of them rare, cause children to suf-
fer in marriage. The first pattern is the bitter marriage filled with open
Amy C. Christian, The Joint Return Rate Structure: Identifying and Addressing the Gendered
Nature of the Tax Law, 13 J.L. & POL. 241,241-42 (1997).
250. See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing,
and the Joint Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 106 (1993).
251. PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES 94-103 (1983).
252. Karen S. Peterson, Kids, Parents Can Make the Best of Divorce, USA TODAY, Jan.
14, 2002, at IA.
253. See GLYNNIS WALKER, SECOND WIFE, SECOND BEST? 45-56 (1984).
254. See Editorial, Encourage Marriage, AUGUSTA CHRON., Feb. 1, 2003, at 4A (sum-
marizing findings that commend the two-parent family as the best environment for a child);




conflict and hostility. Unhappy domesticity can exist without marriage,
to be sure. But an official union will cement some families together
long after their mutual misery could have ended by a less formal
means of separation than state-sponsored divorce. Children fare
poorly in these households.255 Stephanie Coontz and Nancy Folbre re-
port that although children born to teenagers who were married at the
time of the birth do better than children born to never-married teen
parents, children born to teenage parents who married after the birth
do worse, suggesting that marriage can at least accompany, if not
cause, the worsening of domestic conditions. 6
The second variation on marriage that can hurt children, referred
to in the preceding subsection,257 is remarriage, the blending of fami-
lies. Policymakers often manifest a view of marriage as an event writ-
ten on a clean slate - a transition from unsupported isolation to a
nurturing household.258 But many marriages follow, rather than pre-
cede, the formation of a two-generation family. Particularly among
low-income populations, the perpetual target of most pro-marriage
initiatives, newborn children often live with half siblings from their
parents' previous marriages or relationships. 259 State-sponsored mar-
riage often gives birth to a second generation of state-sponsored labels
- stepmother, stepfather, stepchild - and, as was mentioned, law-
based formality tends to make these new roles harder to dissolve.
After decades of denial, observers now report that adjusting to a
new stepfamily is a costly process for a child. 21 Compared with chil-
dren who live in households headed by their original two parents, chil-
255. On the effect of unhappy marriages on children, see PAUL R. AMATO & ALAN
BooTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN AN ERA OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL 238
(1997). The authors claim that "a high-conflict marriage that does not end in divorce" and "a
low-conflict marriage that does end in divorce" are the two worst family settings for children.
Id.
256. Coontz & Folbre, supra note 117.
257. See supra Part III.C.3.
258. See WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 153 (noting an "assumption that every marriage is
a first marriage"); Andrew Cherlin, Remarriage as an Incomplete Institution, 84 AM. J. SOC.
634 (1978) (arguing that popular denial of the reality of remarriage sows confusion and dis-
tress among people living in blended families).
259. E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE:
DIVORCE RECONSIDERED 178-79 (2002); BOB SIMPSON, CHANGING FAMILIES (1998);
Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., The New Extended Family: The Experience of Parents and Chil-
dren After Remarriage, in REMARRIAGE AND STEPPARENTING 42, 42-61 (Kay Pasley &
Marilyn Ihinger-Tallman eds., 1987).
260. See William H. Jeynes, Effects of Remarriage Following Divorce on the Academic
Achievement of Children, 28 J. YOUTH & ADOLESCENCE 385, 386 (1999) (claiming that for
years researchers preferred to believe without evidence "that parental remarriage generally
benefited children," probably because remarriage typically generates additional family in-
come or additional caregiving labor, or both).
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dren who live in stepfamilies fare worse on various indicators.261 As
was noted, the stepmother-stepchild relationship is particularly diffi-
cult, 262 and the harms to children of remarriage increase after re-
remarriage.2 63 Moreover, remarriages and stepfamily-forming mar-
riages are especially prone to divorce,2" and so, even if remarriage is a
good cure for what ails the members of an about-to-be-blended family,
policymakers need to recognize that these pairings often dissolve.
5. Concealing the Work of Caregiving
Marriage gives legal sanction to a locus of poorly remunerated and
poorly measured caregiving work. This work - which can certainly be
a source of deep satisfaction - includes housecleaning, a range of at-
tentions for children and elderly relatives, emotional labor to benefit
others in the family (particularly husbands), and compelled deference
and sacrifice, through which the caregiver is expected to take less, and
261. See SARA MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE
PARENT 19-63 (1994). The generalization holds even when researchers control for family
income. Id.; see also MELVIN KONNER, CHILDHOOD 206 (1991) (finding a heightened risk of
abuse in stepfamilies); Gloria Albrecht, All Families, All Forms, SIGHTINGS, June 5, 2003, at
http://marty-center.uchicago.edu/sightings/archive-2003/0605.shtml (noting estimates that
about ninety percent of children living in original two-parent households score in the normal
range on adjustment measures, whereas among children in stepfamilies or single-parent
homes, about seventy-five to eighty percent score in this range).
262. See Douglas B. Downey, Understanding Academic Achievement Among Children in
Stephouseholds: The Role of Parental Resources, Sex of Stepparent, and Sex of Child, 73 Soc.
FORCES 875 (1995) (studying stepmothers). Lending a little credence to the wicked-
stepmother cartoon stereotype, a study of 24,000 British families reported that stepmothers
and other women living with nonbiologically related children spent less money on "healthy
foods such as milk, fruit and vegetables" to benefit these children than did biologically re-
lated women, and spent more on alcohol and tobacco. Cherry Norton, 'Wicked Stepmother'
Myth Backed by Study, INDEPENDENT (London), Oct. 30, 2000, at 9. For a discussion of the
continuing valence of the wicked-stepmother myth, in which stepmothers join "wolves, gi-
ants, ogres, and witches" as "representations of evil," see Anne C. Jones, Reconstructing the
Stepfamily: Old Myths, New Stories, 48 Soc. WORK 228, 229 (2003).
263. "There's research now that suggests that for children, the sheer number of changes
in family structure that they have to go through may be more difficult than living with a sin-
gle parent," according to marriage-and-family scholar Andrew Cherlin. "So if we put kids in
situations where we're going to be changing their living arrangements several times, we
might put them in more harm than if we just leave them where they are." See Analysis: New
Federal Welfare Plan to Encourage Marriage (NPR radio broadcast, Mar. 13, 2002), for an
interview by Greg Allen with Andrew Cherlin, Professor, Johns Hopkins University. Consis-
tent with other social-science findings, see supra notes 261-262 and accompanying text,
Cherlin adds that children in stepfamilies do not do better than single-parent children on the
teen pregnancy and high school graduation variables. Analysis: New Federal Welfare Plan to
Encourage Marriage, supra.
264. HACKER, supra note 28, at 51; see also HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 259,
at 178-79 (summarizing data about strain in stepfamilies); Wade F. Horn, Stepfamilies Must
Work a Little Harder, WASH. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2001, at El (quoting one estimate that "two of
three stepfamilies break up").
Michigan Law Review
give more, vis-A-vis others in the household.265 Women bear this bur-
den disproportionately, in their roles of wives and mothers, but the
burden can also afflict husbands and fathers. Nobody knows how
much it costs.266
Concealing caregiving has several distinct detrimental effects,
including legal conundrums: how to divide property and fix support
obligations at divorce when the spouse who contributed care and other
unpaid investments to the relationship lacks legal title to the
assets that must be allocated to one spouse or the other;267 whether a
spouse can hold a property interest in her spouse's professional skill
that she helped to cultivate;2" whether wives may make enforceable
contracts with their husbands, agreements that would get them com-
pensated for volunteering to take on caregiving obligations;2 69 and how
judges can administer the tort remedy of spousal consortium when liti-
gants lack a vocabulary to speak of what it means to lose the benefits
of this intimate work.
The mischief of concealing caregiving goes beyond the law. In a so-
cial climate that esteems both capitalism and marriage, the gendered
(and racialized) dyad of a wage-earning husband married to a wage-
dependent wife assigns prestige to the husband. Women often feel
irked by their diminished status; some report ambivalence about, and
discomfort with, the assigned role of caregiver .2 71 African-American
families, in which the gendered-dyad normative structure has less
265. See Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of Family
Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2200 (1995) ("These labors may provide joy, but they are also
burdensome and have material costs and consequences that go uncompensated within the
private family.").
266. The work of New Zealand economist Marilyn Waring is acclaimed for identifying
and measuring this value. See MARILYN WARING, COUNTING FOR NOTHING: WHAT MEN
VALUE AND WHAT WOMEN ARE WORTH (2d ed. 1999).
267. See AMERICAN LAW INST., supra note 33, at § 4.12 (characterizing some property
as marital and some separate without regard to title, but making no recommendation on this
question).
268. Most courts refuse to'recognize such an interest, but some treat earning capacity
enhanced by a spouse's labors as a factor in property division. See WEISBERG & APPLETON,
supra note 4, at 719.
269. Borelli v. Brousseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16, 19-20 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (noting the
wife's preexisting duty to render caregiving labor).
270. See, e.g., Coho Res., Inc. v. McCarthy, 829 So. 2d 1, 18-23 (Miss. 2002) (noting that
consortium damages are difficult to determine); Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d 810, 817
(Me. 1986) (Scolnik, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (same).
271. See Rebecca J. Erickson, Reconceptualizing Family Work: The Effect of Emotion
Work on Perceptions of Marital Quality, 55 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 888, 890-95 (1993) (re-
porting that wives become resentful when they believe they are doing too great a share of
the marriage's emotional work); Katha Pollitt, Utopia, Limited, NATION, July 26, 1996, at 9
(paraphrasing Amy Wax to contend that "many women find stay-at-home motherhood
lonely and boring and financial dependence on their husbands 'irksome and humiliating' ").
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force, often do not fit the pattern, and so women are faulted both for
working outside the home (critics speak of emasculation of the black
man 272) and for staying home to provide care ("welfare mothers" 273).
Married women of all races, but especially white women, who pursue
careers sometimes feel accused of neglect and selfishness towards their
children simply because they leave the home, or close the office door,
in order to work.274 Without the sentimental cloaks and aura of natural
inevitability that state-sponsored marriage offers, the toil of caregiving
would be harder to hide.275
6. The Lost "Vocation" of Singleness
Throughout the past, notably in Christian communities, individuals
have been esteemed for their choice to forgo marriage in favor of a
conscientious single life.276 This tradition has not entirely disappeared
in the contemporary United States, but its erosion has accompanied
the rise of law as central to marriage. When marriage became pre-
dominately a law-based institution, alternative versions of marriage
once prevalent (ecclesiastical marriage, informal marriage) were dis-
placed. The unmarried condition is now extralegal, if not 'unlawful' or
'outlawed'; 277 a decline in singleness as vocation or affirmative choice
has accompanied the solidification of state-sponsored marriage. Indi-
viduals today remain free to divorce or postpone marriage, but in con-
272. See PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST THOUGHT: KNOWLEDGE,
CONSCIOUS-NESS, AND THE POLITICS OF EMPOWERMENT 74 (1990).
273. See Froma Harrop, Trapped in Rhetoric: Hypocrites Bash 'Welfare Mothers,'
PROVIDENCE J., Apr. 2, 2002, at E9 (arguing that the desire to attack women who receive
welfare is itself a "welfare dependency"). See Barbara Ehrenreich, Chamber of Welfare Re-
form, PROGRESSIVE, May 2002, at 14, for a discussion of the conjunction of the two canards
about emasculation and welfare. Ehrenreich criticizes antiwelfare reformers as believing that
welfare cuckolds black men, "usurping their rightful place as breadwinners," leaving them
emasculated and demoralized." Id. at 14.
274. See generally Carol Sanger, Separating from Children, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 375
(1996) (analyzing the "selfishness" construct).
275. See generally Amy L. Wax, Caring Enough: Sex Roles, Work and Taxing Women,
44 VILL. L. REV. 495, 523 (1999) (evaluating these detriments in economic terms).
276. See ELIZABETH GROSZ, SEXUAL SUBVERSIONS 133 (1989) (claiming that chastity
or "frigidity," as Freud termed it, meaning "the refusal of a specifically genital and orgasmic
sexual pleasure," takes a stance against "the patriarchal requirements of heterosexuality"
(emphasis omitted)); THE SINGLE WOMAN: COMMENTS FROM A CHRISTIAN STANDPOINT
(Elizabeth Mitting ed., 1966) (considering singleness as a conscientious path for women). For
praise of the singleness vocation that includes men as well as women, see AL HSU, THE
SINGLE ISSUE 35 (1997), and RODNEY CLAPP, FAMILIES AT THE CROSSROADS 89-113
(1993). The latter work argues that single people are more whole than married ones. Id.
277. These adjectives are offered figuratively, but unmarried persons do complain about
stigma. See Miller, supra note 116 (chastising single women for believing they are entitled to
public validation and support for their lifestyle); supra text accompanying notes 221-223.
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temporary American culture such decisions look like rejections or ab-
stentions, no longer expressions of a contrary conviction.
Disfavoring unmarried adults and favoring married ones, Ameri-
can law diverts individuals from endeavors that demand protracted
isolation, childlessness, sacrifice of sexual gratification, the space to
think quietly, or obedience to extrafamilial authority. Few such en-
deavors enjoy much popularity today, and it is hard for moderns to
mourn their decline. The lost vocation of singleness, however, at one
time bestowed freedoms and opportunities on a respected minority.
The state's privileging of marriage and only marriage has not neces-
sarily endowed Americans with virtues opposite those of isolation and
contemplation. As Linda McClain has argued, one key purpose of
marriage in liberal democracy might be its power to train young citi-
zens in the negotiations that not only characterize intimate life, but
also provide a base from which to explore civic negotiations. In prac-
tice, however, marriage as a legal institution has not demonstrated its
ability to advance this training.27 The lost vocation of singleness, then,
may not have been offset by gains.279
7. Lost Privacy
Claudia Card claims that marriage strips and exposes:
Central to the idea of marriage, historically, has been intimate access to
the persons, belongings, activities, even histories of one another. More
important than sexual access, marriage gives spouses physical access to
each other's residences and belongings, and it gives access to information
about each other, including financial status, that other friends and cer-
tainly the neighbors do not ordinarily have.28°
Other writers also identify a loss of privacy that accompanies mar-
riage." 1 This loss does not mean anything so specific as bathroom
doors that get opened without knocking, but rather a sense that the
retreats of one's life have been breached. 82 Veiling the marriage itself
in law-bound privacy compounds the disquiet, according to Card:
278. See Linda C. McClain, What Price for Marriage (E)quality in Marriage Promotion?
(2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
279. I thank John Witte for broaching this line of thought.
280. Claudia Card, Against Marriage and Motherhood, 11 HYPATIA 1, 13 (1996).
281. Retail magnate Stanley Marcus published an essay noting that "marriage brings
with it a loss of privacy to both sides, a quality most of us need, in various degrees." Stanley
Marcus, Separation Can Be Healthy for Marriage, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 5, 1994, at
9A (discussing earlier journalism exploring this theme).
282. See ANITA ALLEN, UNEASY ACCESS: PRIVACY FOR WOMEN IN A FREE SOCIETY
84-85 (1988) (quoting nineteenth-century feminist Charlotte Perkins Gilman as saying that
marital privacy comes at the expense of a wife's privacy and that the wife's retreats are "re-
sented," or at least "regretted," by other members of the family).
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For all that has been said about the privacy that marriage protects, what
astonishes me is how much privacy one gives up in marrying. This mutual
access appears to be a central point of marrying. Is it wise to abdicate le-
gally one's privacy to that extent? What interests does it serve? Anyone
who in fact cohabits with another may seem to give up similar privacy.
Yet, without marriage, it is possible to take one's life back without en-
countering the law as an obstacle.5 3
When commentators, using a more upbeat rhetoric for the same
concept, speak of the "merger" or "oneness" that melts the walls of
privacy between spouses, 84 they demonstrate that, like the offsets-
versus-detriments juxtaposition considered in connection with primary
and secondary detriments,2 85 "lost privacy" and "merger" illustrate two
sides, the good and the bad, found in marriage. Yet a crucial difference
emerges: whereas many primary and secondary detriments can be
abandoned and then reacquired, privacy once foregone in marriage is
hard to regain. Divorced individuals report a preoccupation with the
intimate content of their former marriages; 6 the intimacy echoes after
it ceases to be shared and, as Card remarks, the law entrenches con-
tinued sharing. Inside violent marriages, privacy builds a locus of
physical conflict. The rage that fuels batterers when their wives try to
leave, well-documented in domestic violence research,27 can be seen
as a struggle over privacy. When she leaves her home, a battered
woman pulls aside the marital curtains; to the batterer whom she
abandons, this airing is violent, cold, and disruptive. What the couple
shared - financial information, responsibility for both battering and
non-battering intimate encounters - does not dissipate but lingers,
mocking the idea of marital privacy as a source of gain.
283. Card, supra note 280, at 13.
284. See Gerry Hostetler, He Was Full of the Best Medicine, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER,
Apr. 6, 2002, at 2B (describing, in an obituary, a man's marriage as a "merger"); Kerry
Sharp, Letter to the Editor, Strong Families Key to Prosperity, EVENING STANDARD
(Palmerston North, New Zealand), June 15, 2001, at 4 ("Marriage is essentially about
oneness.").
285. See supra Parts III.A.4, III.B.4.
286. Here I rely mainly on conversations I have had with divorced persons, but scholarly
writings also support the point. See, e.g., Nannette Diacovo, Note and Comment, California's
Anti-Stalking Statute: Deterrent or False Sense of Security?, 24 Sw. U. L. REV. 389, 397 n.64
(1995) (noting that one survey found that "simple obsessionals, such as an ex-husband/wife"
amounted to half the stalking caseload of the Los Angeles police); J. Herbie DiFonzo, Coer-
cive Conciliation: Judge Paul W. Alexander and the Movement for Therapeutic Divorce, 25 U.
TOL. L. REV. 535, 555-56 (1994) (discussing professionals' perceptions of divorcing individu-
als as obsessive).
287. See NEIL S. JACOBSON & JOHN M. GOTTMAN, WHEN MEN BATTER WOMEN 36-39
(1998) (discussing some batterers' anxiety over abandonment); cf Victoria Nourse, Passion's
Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1345-47
(1997) (noting that a man who kills his wife or partner can frequently gain a manslaughter
rather than a murder charge when he claims as "provocation" the woman's plan or desire to
leave).
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8. Removing the Protection of the Law
Although American law has retreated far from coverture and rec-
ognizes individual identity within marriage much more than it did even
a few decades ago, 21 marriage still blurs the identity of individuals
when they are violators of the law or victims of that violation. In this
sense marriage creates a partial void in civil and criminal law enforce-
ment, a space for wrongdoers to get away with what the state would
elsewhere remedy, punish, and deter. This detriment can be classified
as tertiary because even though law plays a direct role in these excep-
tions and immunities, many of them are unwritten or informal, a ques-
tion of norms. Police manuals, for instance, seldom instruct officers to
take domestic violence less seriously than violence between strang-
ers.
2 89
In the zone of partial lawlessness that marriage establishes, rape
becomes marital rape, often treated more leniently than other kinds of
rape.2' A person can lose a jointly owned possession to forfeiture
without any due process reclamation rights even when she has done
nothing wrong, merely because she is married to a wrongdoer;291 tort-
feasors can, in some states, escape civil responsibility for the harms
they do their husbands or wives; 292 spouses can refuse to support de-
288. In 1981, the Supreme Court invalidated a Louisiana statute, the last such law in the
United States, that named the husband the "head and master" of the marital community. See
Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 456 (1981). In earlier times, this designation was com-
mon. WILLIAM Q. DE FUNIAK & MICHAEL J. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY
PROPERTY § 113 (2d ed. 1971). Vestiges of coverture remain in mid-century case law. See
Samuel v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 375 F. Supp. 1119, 1130-34 (W.D. Pa. 1974) (striking down a
university rule that assigned wives their husbands' domicile to determine their tuition);
Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217, 222-23 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (holding that an Alabama law
requiring a wife to use her husband's surname was not unconstitutional).
289. Fajardo v. County of Los Angeles, 179 F.3d 698, 699-701 (9th Cir. 1999) (challeng-
ing informal classification of domestic violence 911 calls as less important). The relation
between marriage and domestic violence is murky. Married women report less domestic
violence than unmarried women, but they may simply be underreporting it. See Popenoe,
The Top Ten Myths of Marriage, supra note 234, at 7. Women are especially likely to be
battered in the setting of unmarried cohabitation, a fact that might commend marriage. Id.
Alternatively, the existence of state-sponsored marriage might encourage a batterer to view
the woman he lives with as subordinate to him.
290. See 2 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 213.1, at 345 cmt.8 (rev. ed.
1980) (urging that the law of rape not "thrust the prospect of criminal sanctions into the
ongoing process of adjustment in the marital relationship").
291. Bennis v. Michigan, 516 U.S. 442, 447-49 (1996). Bennis leaves open the question of
what rights an innocent co-owner would have if he or she were not married to the wrong-
doer. Id. It would be reasonable to suppose, however, that married people are particularly
likely to own forfeitable property jointly.
292. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-8 (1999) (retaining immunity unless marriage has broken
down); Lucero v. Valdez, 884 P.2d 199, 201-05 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that Utah has
not fully abrogated immunity); Williams v. Williams, 439 N.E.2d 1055, 1056-58 (Ill. App. Ct.
1982); Cloud v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 440 So. 2d 961, 962 n.1 (La. Ct. App.
1983); Bonkowsky v. Bonkowsky, 431 N.E.2d 998, 998-99 (Ohio 1982).
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pendent spouses with a decent minimum of comfort in relation to what
they can afford, even though divorce would make these obligations
enforceable.293 Parents who if divorced would be ordered to pay col-
lege tuition for their children can deny any such obligation and get
away with it.294 From this lawless center, norms resembling the slogan
of Might Makes Right govern private lives. Justice can become merely
"the interest of the stronger" '295 inside marriage, while elsewhere the
rule of law hampers the same kind of abuse.
IV. REVISING THE "CASE"
This Part seeks to build a narrow argument. It begins by sketching
what any case for marriage can and cannot achieve. Next it considers
two existing defenses of marriage, both less comprehensive than the
failed utilitarian case. Unpersuaded by the reasoning of these two ar-
guments, I nevertheless praise them for their cogency and parsimony.
Continuing in the direction of ever-more-parsimonious rationales to
support this institution, I conclude that although a thick or robust de-
fense of state-sponsored marriage cannot be sustained, a thinner one
emerges.
A. What State-Sponsored Marriage Can Do
"State interference is an evil," wrote Oliver Wendell Holmes,
"where it cannot be shown to be a good."2" Although American law at
times applies coercion to individuals without an accompanying ration-
ale about welfare, such instances are exceptions within a larger scheme
rooted in public reason and ought to be challenged. Law constrains,
but it should not do so without a good reason, one that is intelligible to
interested and disinterested persons alike."9 This starting point about
a good rationale, more conservative than the "harm principle" associ-
ated with John Stuart Mill and also more informative than such catch-
phrases as "substantive due process" and "fundamental rights," helps
to explain why it might be a good idea for the state to sponsor mar-
riage: marriage could increase welfare.
293. McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336,342 (Neb. 1953).
294. See Bix, supra note 110, at 12 & n.55.
295. PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 35-36 (Richard W. Sterling & William C. Scott trans., W.W.
Norton & Co. 1985) (attributing this concept to Thrasymachus).
296. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 77 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
Harv. Univ. Press 1963) (1881).
297. I elaborate in Anita Bernstein, The Representational Dialectic (With Illustrations
from Obscenity, Forfeiture, and Accident Law), 87 CAL. L. REV. 305,364-68 (1999).
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Wrongheaded considerations about welfare, however, continue to
clutter public discourse. We have already considered in detail the
sinking "case for marriage," which asserts that individuals should
choose marriage because of the institution's supposed payoffs. Al-
though the data commend marrying rather than remaining unmarried
(at least for most people), marriage partisans have not contemplated
seriously a world without state-sponsored marriage. Their arguments
in favor of marriage thus apply only, and at most, to the question of
whether an individual should marry in a society where marriage exists
and bestows benefits upon those who choose to wed; they do not re-
fute the claim that marriage should be abolished.
1. The Public-Reason Constraint
Whereas the case-for-marriage argument fails because it is incom-
plete, other arguments fail because they are too particular. A public-
reason justification for retaining marriage must lie within reach of all
citizens to discover and debate as human beings, rather than as mem-
bers of a subgroup.298 Accordingly, religious rationales for continuing
marriage do not shed light on what the state should do. Even if we put
aside First Amendment obstacles to these rationales, no single religion
unites all Americans in the sense that they are united by shared rea-
son.299 Family-values traditionalism and conservative references to the
past - "it must be this way because it has always been this way" -
fall short on the same ground of too much particularity." ° We are not
all social conservatives. Not everybody embraces "family values."
If marriage is to survive as one of a dwindling number of compre-
hensive statuses that the law continues to respect, then it must pay at-
tention to the dignity and autonomy of the individual, a concern that
militates against status in general. Every status is inherently illiberal,
but even illiberal categories or tendencies in the American legal sys-
tem must recognize that the individual is fundamental. Getting mar-
ried, then, must result in keeping some freedoms alive even if it must
also extinguish others. Exit is the most fundamental of these freedoms:
298. See Rauch, supra note 109, passim (insisting on a clear and "secular" civic under-
standing of marriage).
299. One might mention again that religious rites would be unaffected by the abolition
of state-sponsored marriage.
300. Some disagree. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2495 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (concluding that if longstanding tradition supports "morals legislation," such support
should suffice to protect it from being overturned); L. Lynn Hogue, State Common-Law
Choice-of-Law Doctrine and Same-Sex "Marriage": How Will Courts Enforce the Public
Policy Exception?, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 29, 36 (1998) ("I persist in believing that a well-
grounded distaste for particular conduct that is viewed as morally objectionable by a major-
ity within a democratic society... is not a product of unreasoned fear.., but rather of
proper moral reservation.").
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individuals not otherwise disabled must have the prerogative to go
from unmarried to married and from married to unmarried. Beyond
the prerogative of exit, a liberal version of marriage must tread cau-
tiously on the expressed preferences and life plans of individuals.
2. Gender Equity: A Conservative Approach
Many people committed to liberality take a stance against the sub-
ordination of women in marriage and in favor of making marriage
available to same-sex couples. I share these inclinations but do not
press them strongly in a case for marriage that aspires to be thin. Like
religious understandings of marriage and family-values beliefs, a
commitment to diminishing the force of gender in marriage - that is,
a stance against constraints on women's freedom and the current
opposite-sex criterion of access to the status - is still something of a
particularistic stance. To many, the principles against subordination of
women in marriage and in favor of access to marriage for same-sex
couples are just as self-evident and as easy and as amenable to public
reason, as the stance against old miscegenation laws that prohibited
individuals of different races from marrying each other.30' This per-
spective has not yet gained recognition in the law.3 2
It is possible, however, to advocate liberality with respect to gender
in conservative terms - as an inclination, rather than a source of yes-
no rules. Because the constraint of public reason prohibits the state
from coercing individuals unless there is a good reason to do so, the
state should not craft its law of marriage to force individuals into a
gender script - for instance, decreeing that a man may marry only a
woman and a woman may marry only a man, or that a husband rather
than a wife has the prerogative to choose the couple's place of resi-
dence - unless there is a good reason to impose this script on persons
who will find it coercive. This position, unlike the stronger stance that
views the law of marriage as illegitimate until it comes to comply with
gender equity, has won influence in American law. While gender eq-
uity remains contested in public discussion in a way that race equity
does not, it enjoys wide support and continues to make gains in public
discourse. Accordingly, the stance I advocate here emphasizes proce-
dure rather than substance: The law of marriage should respect and
bear in mind the claims that feminists and same-sex activists have
made regarding marriage, without necessarily acceding to all of them.
301. Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men is Sex
Discrimination, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 235-36 (1994) (advancing miscegenation analogy).
302. But see Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2483-84 (2003) (quoting Bowers




3. The Business Analogy
Recent scholarly initiatives explore the connection between the
law of marriage and the only other field in contemporary American
law that continues to emphasize status as a full-throttle complement to
contract: the law of business.3"3 As Martha Ertman has elaborated,
partnerships, corporations, and limited liability companies provide
examples of status-based constraints on freedom that override con-
tracts and other instances of individual choice, just as marriage does,
but rely on "functionalist reasoning" rather than the "moral judg-
ment" and "purportedly natural differences" so central to family
law.3" In a world in which apolitical objectivity has been deemed unat-
tainable, business law comes closer than any other subject to giving
marriage law an ideal of neutrality to emulate.
Persons who engage in entrepreneurial commercial activity find
that ideology does not fetter their behavior much. Businesses typically
pursue profit, but they need not do so." Business law relies on the
construct of markets, a tendency that some deem ideological; but mar-
ket rhetoric can be kept separate from the gender script that attributes
oppressive conditions to nature or divine design, and helps to build a
contrary ideal of nonintervention, which in turn can augment freedom
for individuals." 6 Professor Ertman invokes the numerous parallels
between the law of marriage and the law of close corporations to ar-
gue that corporate law provides a model for a morally neutral revision
of state-sponsored marriage.3 7 Professor Case builds a related analogy
between the law of corporate bankruptcy and the law of divorce, ar-
guing that both commend a "fresh start" and a focus on putting assets
303. Professors Mary Anne Case and Paul Mahoney formed a project called "The Role
of the State in Marriage and Corporations," following what Case describes as a quarter cen-
tury that saw the ascendancy of the contractual theory of the corporation. In this project
scholars frame analogies between business and marriage. See Mary Anne Case, What Stake
Do Heterosexual Women Have in the Same-Sex Marriage/Domestic Partnership/Civil
Union Debates? 29 (2003) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author); WEITZMAN, supra
note 5, at 240 (noting similarities between "marriage partnerships and business partner-
ships"); Ertman, supra note 6; Cynthia Stames, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A
Discourse on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissolution Under No-Fault, 60 U.
CHI. L. REV. 67, 119-38 (1993) (propounding a partnership analogy); Margaret Sokolov,
Marriage Contracts for Support and Services: Constitutionality Begins at Home, 49 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1161, 1188 (1974) (predicting that the business contracts and the marriage contracts of
the future will resemble each other more closely); see also Alicia Brokars Kelly, The Marital
Partnership Pretense and Career Assets: The Ascendancy of Self over the Marital Community,
81 B.U. L. REV. 59, 62-63, 72 (2001) (faulting current divorce law for its infidelity to the
quasi-business partnership ideal).
304. Ertman, supra note 6, at 83.
305. See id. at 90 n.59 (noting the legal recognition of nonprofit businesses).
306. Id. at 90.
307. Id. at 112-23.
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to productive use, and noting that both have turned away from pinning
stigma on failed entities." At least in principle, the law of marriage,
emulating the law of business, could address the rights and interests of
the individuals whom marriage affects, rather than rest on gender and
other socially scripted constraints on individuals' choices.
B. Two Cogent Arguments in Favor of State-Sponsored Marriage
Scholars take state-sponsored marriage for granted. Almost none
have set out to defend it against an abolitionist proposition. In the
large body of writings that applaud "the family," an institution consid-
ered vulnerable to feminism and individualism as well as macroeco-
nomic phenomena such as the decline of wage labor, however, one
does find copious cheering for marriage. Among these cheers, two ar-
guments warrant particular attention.
1. Belonging and Shelter in a Postmodern World
Bruce Hafen speaks of "belonging" as a necessary condition for
human fulfillment.3" Although the idea of belonging to, or possessing,
another person can connote enslavement or objectification, Hafen ar-
gues, "the bonds of kinship and marriage are valuable ties that
bind."31 Hafen worries that liberal individualism has brought about a
current "age of the waning of belonging," and defends marriage as in-
tegral to the struggle against loneliness."
Family law scholar Milton C. Regan, Jr. has crafted a more de-
tailed argument for the ongoing vitality of status-based family law
within a liberal and feminist jurisprudence.312 Professor Regan aspires
to a defense of status-based family law that, contrary to a longstanding
tradition in the field, does not rest on children's vulnerability and de-
pendence: he aspires to explain all of family law including its childless
aspects. As he must, Regan begins by acknowledging that status in
family law is associated with oppression, especially oppression of
women: "the Victorians gave status a bad name." '313 Paradoxically,
however, the constraint of status is necessary to generate the empow-
ered self that individualism upholds.
308. Case, supra note 303, at 34.
309. Bruce Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The Waning of Belong-
ing, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1, 31-42.
310. Id. at 31-34.
311. Id. at 32.
312. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY (1993);
Regan, supra note 3.
313. Regan, supra note 3, at 165.
November 20031
Michigan Law Review
Without status, Regan explains, a person bobbles from episode to
episode without continuity of identity. The autonomous individual so
prized in modernism and contractarian political thought is not a
daughter, a husband, or somebody's child, hemmed in by the duties
and commitments that these identities impose. These people are free.
A transaction eagerly embraced today might become dull or distaste-
ful tomorrow - the individual might feel less like a son then, or more
like a mother. To Regan this figure does not embody "the
Enlightenment dream of individual emancipation"3"4 but rather is
lonely and pitiful, worse off than he would have been without the ties
of status. Buffeted by "the winds of each passing experience," unpro-
tected from whatever stimuli come his way, this person cannot main-
tain the sense of being "a purposive agent." '315 And when one loses
status, one loses identity and intimacy. Identity diminishes because
only status can remind us that our past will shape and frame our pres-
ent and future. Intimate commitment becomes harder to achieve be-
cause intimacy is dependent on identity. Without a self to unite last
year's promises with tomorrow's array of options, there is no reason to
feel bound or even affected by an episode in the past that linked one
person with another.316 So hampered in their pursuit of intimacy and
identity, individuals suffer.
In order to assuage these harsh effects, individuals need the sup-
port of marriage. The fragmenting effects of postmodern life notwith-
standing, most people seek a primary relationship as a base of roman-
tic and sexual intimacy. The quest can lead to great pain: Regan notes
the vulnerability that derives from looking for, and also from having
found, a partner. Just as economic vulnerability justifies regulation to
override freedom of contract, at least in the post-Lochner era, the
emotional vulnerability that always accompanies the romantic dyad
means that law should sponsor a status of marriage Regan argues, in
order to affirm responsibilities that derive from dependence and mu-
tual vulnerability.317
314. Id. at 162.
315. See id. at 164.
316. Id. at 170.
317. Id. at 168. In an effort to move marriage from status to contract, one might consider
the possibility of enhancing marital stability within a body of marital "contract" law encom-
passing harsh penalties for breach. Such a doctrine could adopt some principles of current
contract law, for example by allowing parties to collect for divorce-related economic loss or
to pre-set difficult-to-calculate liquidated damages, much as prenuptual agreements cur-
rently allow. Marital "contract" law might build on these traditional principles, also allowing
parties to collect, for example, damages for emotional trauma. The additional stability, how-
ever, could come at a substantial cost: it might undermine our no-fault divorce system, force
persons unable to pay damages to stay in decaying marriages, and result in unconstitutional
discrimination against the poor, who would face limitations on their fundamental right to
divorce.
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Could marriage, for Regan, exist without state sponsorship? Regan
says little about the legal consequences of marital status in a harmoni-
ous or otherwise ongoing marriage. Regarding divorce, however,
Regan finds doctrinal applications,3 18 suggesting to readers that his
conception of status has state-sponsored marriage in mind, rather than
an informal status relation like the boyfriend-girlfriend dyad in con-
temporary society or a pair united only by contract in the hypothetical
future world, after state-sponsored marriage is abolished. At a mini-
mum Regan appears to insist on retaining the legal category of "fam-
ily," where individuals are constrained at least by social norms, if not
legal rules, from doing whatever they please. He notes with disap-
proval the academic perception that "the family" is just one variant on
"the close relationship situation." 319
This vagueness on what "family" means mars an otherwise elegant
argument and suggests that Regan's thesis does not complete the task
of defending the existence of state-sponsored marriage. If all we need
is any status label, however inconsequential to the law, in order to find
refuge from postmodern clangor, then "partner" and "lover" would
serve as well as "husband" and "wife." If, alternatively, Regan intends
for marriage to be a status with significant law-based constraints, then
he needs to explain how to balance individualism against respect for
status in one's everyday life - that is to say, as a participant in one's
own marriage - and family law. Regan purports to endorse two con-
trary values. He commends sensitivity to "the solitary and the social
dimension of our being" but also urges "an equilibrium in which both
status and contract play a role. '32' At this high level of generality, all
answers to tough questions become possible, and the defense of state-
sponsored marriage crumbles.
2. The Savage Hypothesis
From an array of disciplines and perspectives - feminism notably
excluded - some scholars applaud marriage for its effects in socializ-
ing men: half the human race, they say, has brutish inclinations that
society must moderate. In 1986, before the fathers' and marriage
movements got underway, George Gilder offered a book-length expo-
318. See id. at 171-74 (contending that parties to a divorce should have the option of
bringing fault into the adjudication); id. at 174-78 (arguing against "the clean break" ap-
proach to property division, favoring instead an effort to leave husband and wife with an
equal standard of living, particularly if the marriage was long). The former suggestion is
critiqued in Ira Mark Ellman & Sharon Lohr, Marriage as Contract, Opportunistic Violence,
and Other Bad Arguments for Fault Divorce, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 719,724-37.
319. Regan, supra note 3, at 162.
320. Id. at 174.
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sition of this argument.12 Men and Marriage begins with a claim that
civilization is what human beings achieve when the long-term timeta-
ble and sense of futurity inherent in female sexuality overpower male
sexual impulses:
In creating civilization, women transform male lust into love; channel
male wanderlust into jobs, homes, and families; link men to specific chil-
dren; rear children into citizens; change hunters into fathers; divert male
will to power into a drive to create. Women conceive the future that men
tend to flee; they feed the children that men ignore.322
As Gilder sees the sexes, women enjoy a unique serenity because
of the capacities they find in their bodies. They are capable of diverse
sexual acts and experiences, whereas men have only two meager ones,
erection and ejaculation: "Nothing about the male body dictates any
specific pattern beyond a repetitive release of sexual tension. 3 23
Whether she bears children or not, each woman knows that she can
"perform the only act that gives sex an unquestionable meaning, an
incarnate result. 3 24 Contrast her tragic fellow human being:
For men the desire for sex is not simply a quest for pleasure. It is an in-
dispensable test of identity. And in itself it is always ultimately temporary
and inadequate. Unless his maleness is confirmed by his culture, he must
enact it repeatedly, and perhaps destructively for himself or his soci-
ety.... A man without a woman has a deep inner sense of dispensability,
perhaps evolved during the millennia of service in the front lines of tribal
defense. He is sexually optional. 325
The consequences to society are clear. Impulsive, trapped in the
present, more cut off physically from nurturing and consequently from
caring about human beings - cut off even from valuing his own life -
this person is not only uncivilized but an active menace to civilized
321. GEORGE GILDER, MEN AND MARRIAGE (1986).
322. Id. at 5.
323. Id. at 8-9.
324. Id. at 9.
325. Id. at 11, 15; see also DAVID T. COURTWRIGHT, VIOLENT LAND: SINGLE MEN AND
SOCIAL DISORDER FROM THE FRONTIER TO THE INNER CITY (1996); David Popenoe, Life
Without Father, in LOST FATHERS: THE POLITICS OF FATHERHOOD IN AMERICA 33, 36
(Cynthia R. Daniels ed., 1998) ("Left culturally unregulated, men's sexual behavior can be
promiscuous, their paternity casual, their commitment to families weak.") [hereinafter
Popenoe, Life Without Father]. The prevalence of longterm gay male dyads might refute this
rather stereotypical depiction. Writers debate whether homosexually inclined men desire or
embrace marriage-like monogamous relationships. Compare George W. Dent, Jr., The
Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & POL. 581, 642-43 (1999) (quoting WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 83 (1996) (commenting that gay men
eschew "quasi-marriages")), with Letitia Anne Peplau, Lesbian and Gay Relationships, in
HOMOSEXUALITY 177, 179-81 (John C. Gonsiorek & James D. Weinrich eds., 1991) (finding
a similar desire among opposite-sex and same-sex couples, including men and women, for a
long, enduring relationship, and noting the endurance of very long-lived pairings among gay
men and women).
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people. Young single men, writes David Popenoe, "make up the ma-
jority of deviants, delinquents, criminals, killers, drug users, vice lords,
and miscreants of every kind." '326 Compared to married men, single
men drink almost twice as much; they are also more likely to have
drinking problems, to drink and drive, and to get into fights.327 Al-
though they constitute about thirteen percent of the population over
age fourteen, they commit nearly ninety percent of major and violent
crimes.321 "Groups of sociologists venturing into urban streets after
their seminars on violence in America do not rush to their taxis fearing
attack by marauding bands of feminists, covens of single women, or
angry packs of welfare mothers," writes Gilder. "[O]ne need have lit-
tle fear of any group that so much as contains women - or, if the truth
be known, of any group that contains men who are married to
women."32 9 Another writer claims that men, who "constitute the ma-
jority, and the most productive portion, of the workforce" would have
less incentive to work hard if marriage were abolished - and none
whatsoever, if Martha Fineman were to succeed in having government
pay women to care for their children at the same rate that marriage
now compensates them.33° In this perspective, marriage rescues not
only a man, who would be lonely and worth little otherwise, but the
society around him.
Other writings have advanced the thesis that this bleakness is repli-
cated in a second generation: they associate being deprived of a father
in one's home with deviant or antisocial behavior. The sons of ab-
sconded scoundrels are the chief offenders, but writers worry also
about daughters, more vulnerable to teen pregnancy and out-of-
wedlock childbearing when their parents are separated or divorced.331
A correlation between fatherlessness and troubled children is widely
accepted.332 In sum, here in the savage hypothesis men must marry
326. Popenoe, Life Without Father, supra note 325, at 43.
327. Waite, supra note 117, at 15-16.
328. GILDER, supra note 321, at 65; see also Scott J. South & Steven F. Messner, Crime
and Demography: Multiple Linkages, Reciprocal Relations, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 83, 86 (2000)
(reviewing evidence that marriage seems to reduce a man's propensity for crime). Married
men are, however, well-represented in the ranks of white-collar criminals. Edward Helmore,
Want to Survive in the Slammer? Then Feign Paranoia. Don't Stare. And Take Pyjamas,
OBSERVER, Jul. 6, 1997, at 17 (reporting on the enterprise of "con consultants" who give tips
to clients, most of whom are "white, middle-aged, married men involved in white-collar
crime," about how to get through their prison sentences, and claiming that this business is "a
winner" because of increases in white-collar crime).
329. GILDER, supra note 321, at 64-65.
330. Lloyd R. Cohen, Rhetoric, The Unnatural Family, and Women's Work, 81 VA. L.
REV. 2275, 2289 (1995).
331. See Popenoe, Life Without Father, supra note 325, at 41-43.
November 20031
Michigan Law Review
and stay married - because if they don't, they will take us all down
with them. 333
C. Toward a Third Way: Marriage Reenvisioned
At this point we have aired the principal arguments for state-
sponsored marriage, classifying them as either not cogent or cogent.
Much of the utilitarian "case for marriage" - marriage is good be-
cause it makes people healthy, wealthy, and happy - reduces to tau-
tology.334 Moreover, it collapses when its unstated beliefs, chief among
them the notion that state-sponsored marriage can never be elimi-
nated, fail to support its weight. The utilitarian "case for marriage" is
not cogent.
The last two arguments, however, follow a sturdy inner logic.
Having ably contended that an individual needs some kind of status
role in order to achieve intimacy and identity, Milton Regan is able to
portray marriage as tending to ease the existential sadness that comes
from relating to other persons only through one's bargains and epi-
sodic encounters. 3" The savage hypothesis is cogent too. If one posits
that men are inherently different from women, and that the ways in
which they differ from women conduce to social instability and havoc,
then the highly gendered institution of marriage becomes a way to
cabin men, reducing the social harm they would otherwise cause. One
need not agree with either argument in order to agree that both make
sense on their own terms, in a way that the utilitarian "case for mar-
riage" does not.
Mere cogency, however, cannot justify engraving an argument into
public policy. Premises must be questioned, and then rejected if they
prove wrong. The conclusion of wrongness can derive from varied
commitments. For example, it would be wrong not to lower the speed
332. But see Judith Stacey, Dada-ism in the 1990s: Getting Past Baby Talk About Fa-
therlessness, in LOST FATHERS, supra note 325, at 51, 64 (noting that social science has not
settled on a definition of "fatherlessness" and so cannot identify what it causes, if anything).
As will be familiar by now, other variables, especially money, are also significant: losing a
father means losing some of the income he would otherwise have contributed, and poverty is
also correlated with antisocial behavior. Wade C. Mackey & Nancy S. Coney, The Enigma of
Father Presence in Relationship to Sons' Violence and Daughters' Mating Strategies: Empiri-
cism in Search of a Theory, 8 J. MEN'S STUD. 349 (2000) (citing sources).
333. It is odd that such high-pitched apocalyptic phobia, casting the masculine nature as
antithetical to civilization, comes almost exclusively from conservative men. As feminist
scholar Drucilla Cornell has remarked, few women, "even in their worst fantasies and fears,"
hold so bleak and negative a view of what men offer the world. Drucilla Cornell, Fatherhood
and Its Discontents: Men, Patriarchy, and Freedom, in LOST FATHERS, supra note 325, at 183,
183. This discourse also eliminates nonheterosexual men from its consideration.
334. See supra Part II.C.
335. See supra notes 313-318 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 102:129
For and Against Marriage
limit on a highway just before a sharp curve, because principles related
to automobile braking and deceleration make unreduced, pre-curve
speeds dangerous. Such principles appear to be, and I would say really
are, prepolitical and nonideological.
While the "belonging" argument of Hafen and Regan contains no
a priori affronts of this kind, the savage hypothesis is at best indeter-
minate as a matter of descriptive fact, the reality that lawmakers need
to consider in such contexts as setting highway speed limits. One might
say that descriptive fact, however politically incorrect or inconvenient,
must always outweigh even the best-intentioned attempts to revise the
truth. Perhaps. Yet the question of how inherently different men and
women are from each other - before politics, before ideology, before
even their birth as persons - cannot be measured in a setting so per-
meated with socially installed and enforced gender roles as the con-
temporary United States. Adequate laboratory conditions for such a
study are not present; we do not have the data needed to support a
hypothesis that men inherently demand extra measures of socializa-
tion. The farrago of proclamations from journalists and some social
scientists that male and female human beings are fundamentally more
different than alike - based on leaps of faith, tiny samples, tenden-
tious inferences from ambiguous data, ideological readings of what
anthropologists report, and the disregard of contrary evidence -
proves only that strong versions of gender dimorphism have a big fol-
lowing in both the media and the academy,336 not that conjectures
about that dimorphism are true or false. And so, forced to proceed
without guidance from social science, policymakers must rely on
American political and jurisprudential commitments.
Whether true or false or something in between, the savage hy-
pothesis affronts several distinct precepts of American law and law-
making. Its claim that legal rules and institutions should regard men as
brutes dishonors the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution,
which limits the effect that government can give to gender-based
stereotypes. 37 Its sweeping denigration of millions of people offends
procedural justice.338 If engraved into legal doctrine and public policy
it would, or should, hurt the "hearts and minds" of men and boys so
insulted.339 Its dismissal of the passage of time and the accretion of cul-
336. See Bernstein, supra note 175, at 36-40 (citations omitted).
337. Some late twentieth-century Supreme Court case law can be read in this light. See,
e.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 550 (1996) (striking down sex segregation as
practiced in a state military academy); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634-36 (1996) (invali-
dating a state law that took an antagonistic stance toward homosexually inclined persons).
338. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988) (arguing that an inclination toward procedural justice, ex-
tending beyond the legal system, is rooted in human psychology).
339. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
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ture - evolutionary psychology sees human nature as fixed in the sa-
vanna of the Stone Age - expresses a posture hostile to negotiation
and political compromise, one that the Supreme Court has held to in-
validate numerous laws.' Its portrait of the male human being as de-
structive, sociopathic, and an enemy of order is at odds with such
foundational documents as the Declaration of Independence and the
Bill of Rights, which recognize the citizen's capacity for thought,
speech, religious belief, association and assembly, giving and receiving
counsel, and civic participation.
Although American lawmakers and policymakers are thus pre-
cluded from using the savage hypothesis as a condemnation, or even a
reductive summary, of male humanity, they can share some of the val-
ues that happen to animate Men and Marriage and other expressions
of the hypothesis - those beliefs that do not affront equal protection,
procedural justice, and civic governance. Classifying men as savages is
categorically wrong. A concern for civil society and sociopolitical sta-
bility, however, is laudable.
From these two cogent arguments favoring state-sponsored mar-
riage, then, we can see the outlines of a newer case for marriage, one
that escapes both the vagueness of Regan's indeterminate endorse-
ment of status on the one hand, and the gender shackles of the savage
hypothesis on the other. The cogent arguments take a crucial step for-
ward in defending marriage. Although marriage has let many people
down, made them worse off, and caused harm to society, its ideals and
practices offer genuine goods. 4 In benefiting individuals it can benefit
third parties and the larger society as well.
Marriage holds the potential of giving individuals more of a past
and a future than they would otherwise have. When they marry, espe-
cially if they are relatively young at the time, couples convincingly re-
port a feeling of connection to their ancestors, progenitor couples who
entered unions of their own, while looking ahead. 2 Past and future
are partner concepts, not opposites. As Robert Nisbet and other
scholars of progressivism have detailed, a sense of the past makes a
340. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 386-87 (1964) (invalidating a vote-dilution scheme);
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (holding that vote-dilution cases are justiciable in
federal court); United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (identi-
fying the need for judges to look out for "discrete and insular minorities" as political actors).
The rise of voting-rights jurisprudence rests on a premise that human beings are injured
when they are deprived of meaningful political participation. See Pamela S. Karlan, The
Rights to Vote: Some Pessimism About Formalism, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1705, 1709-33 (1993)
(conceptualizing the right to vote in broad categories: participation, aggregation, and gov-
ernance).
341. See Witte, supra note 38 (noting "goods" of marriage).
342. Sarah Blustain, Counterproposal, LILITH, Spring 2000, at 17, available at
http://www.poppolitics.com/articles/2000-06-19-counterproposal.shtml.
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sense of the future possible and coherent.343 Neither human beings nor
societies can flourish without a prevailing belief that the future holds
some meanings and consequences for them.3" As a form of enforced
commitment, state-sponsored marriage facilitates investment - that
is, the sacrifice of short-term gain for the prospect of returns in the
long term - just as other state-sponsored enforced commitments, like
procedural rules and the protection of property holdings, facilitate
economic investment.
To opponents of marriage, these values will sound ominous: a critic
can hear the clink and rattle of chains. This critic might start by saying
that even if marrying does give individuals a sense of connection to the
past, other avenues toward this connection might work better. Perhaps
marriage has obstructed their development. Moreover, Regan's ele-
gant admonition that individual human fulfillment cannot emerge
without the status roles that build a sense of self and permit intimate
connection to another person notwithstanding, this idealized version
of marriage - as shelter, continuity, investment base, buffer against
impulses and seductive opportunities - overlooks much oppression
inherent in the institution. The legal category of marriage has begotten
a generation of pernicious newer categories: marital rape (and the
Model Penal Code's "spousal exemption" to rape), family immunity
from tort liability, tax rules that encourage husbands to make money
and avoid their families while discouraging wives from earning wages,
"bastardy" and "legitimacy" to describe the status of children, de-
fense-of-marriage state laws that do nothing except denigrate same-sex
unions, and numerous other hurtful concepts. 3" I deny none of these
harmful effects of state-sponsored marriage, and indeed have gone to
some trouble to catalogue and recite them. But this re-accounting
finds gain as well as loss: the "case" for state-sponsored marriage ne-
glects a crucial point.
The point may be seen as the political and communal counterpart
to Regan's postmodernist psychology, which focuses on marriage as a
source of gain for individuals. To the extent he is persuasive, Regan
redeems marriage from the perspective of a solitary person who seeks
identity and intimacy, but does not link this individual's opportunity
with a societal interest in marriage. In order to demonstrate a distinct
societal interest in marriage one must show that letting human beings
achieve identity and intimacy makes for a gain to the collective, such
343. ROBERT A. NISBET, HISTORY OF THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1980); MADSEN PIRIE,
TRIAL AND ERROR AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1978).
344. Here Gilder and Regan explicitly agree. See also Steven L. Nock, Time and Gender
in Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1971, 1974-75 (2000) ("[M]arriage is experienced mainly in the
future and in the past.").
345. See generally Card, supra note 280.
November 2003]
Michigan Law Review
as better citizens or greater economic prosperity.' It may be the case
that because statuses always require societal recognition, Regan has
necessarily made a political and social point as well as a psychological
one. But the argument in favor of a status (a social construct) needs to
show how societies gain when that status is in place.347
If marriage and comparable statuses were to disappear, the indi-
vidual would flutter from transaction to transaction, contract to con-
tract, and encounter to encounter, Regan says, bouncing like images
on MTV.3" What happens to society, to the body politic, as this person
bounces? It too might be unmoored from a base of deep tradition and
continuity. But unlike the individual, who in Regan's exposition dis-
solves and becomes lost, a society can hold itself together without
state-sponsored marriage. Marriage as a law-based status arrived rela-
tively recently in human existence.349 Humanity can live without it.
We arrive at the relevant question for legal policy: what would
American society be like if the state were to withdraw from recogniz-
ing marriage, a status now derived from the romantic dyad? How
would humanity live without it in the United States? Not by failing to
cohere, like Regan's lost individual. Instead, some new source of
power and governance would move into the space that marriage now
holds. There are only two contenders for this role in governing private
lives.35 One is the state, regulating individuals directly rather than
346. See infra note 370 (noting arguments that the marriage movement has failed
to make).
347. In her classic critique of state-sponsored marriage, Lenore Weitzman takes pains to
detail this kind of analysis. See WEITZMAN, supra note 5, at 246-54 (concluding a chapter
titled "The Case for Intimate Contracts" with a survey of the "social policy issues" that her
proposal implicates).
348. Regan, supra note 3, at 163.
349. Boaz, supra note 3 (noting the relatively recent date, 1754, on which the Earl of
Hardwick's Act gave the (secular) government authority over marriage). I thank Joan
Mahoney for emphasizing this point.
350. Marriage scholar Steven Nock elaborates on where this power can lie, finding five
possible locations:
As a sociologist, I see norms as the primary source of social order and conformity. Norms,
that is, are the building blocks of social institutions. My perspective begins by viewing any
society as a cluster of integrated social institutions. While there may be many such institutions
in any one society, all societies have at least five. There is always an organized system of se-
curing and distributing goods and services, or an economy. There is always some organized
method for transmitting knowledge from one generation to the next, or an educational insti-
tution. There is always an organized pattern of protection and formal social control, or a
state. There is always an organized system of dealing with the ultimately unknowable, or a
religion. And there is always a patterned system to distribute the obligations for dependent
individuals (children and the elderly), or a family.
Nock, supra note 344, at 1972. Educational systems are not contenders for power over inti-
mate lives, and the First Amendment disqualifies religion from overt governance within
American law (although it would undoubtedly gain power if state-sponsored marriage were
abolished). The three other institutions remain available to govern family life.
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through its current indirect practice of making a status out of a pairing.
The other is the market. As they do under contemporary liberal re-
gimes around the world with respect to economics, the two would
likely share power in a postmarriage legal regime. Moving toward the
terrain that state-sponsored marriage now occupies, they would each
gain the opportunity to grow stronger.
A liberal policymaker who is willing to consider abolishing state-
sponsored marriage has good reason to proceed with caution before
ceding new prerogatives to either the state or the market. To many
who have contemplated the abolition of state-sponsored marriage,
new state-sponsored initiatives - either well-framed default rules to
be used when disputes arise within a relationship, or an array of offi-
cial legal options that couples could choose when approaching state
registries - would necessarily follow this particular law reform.351
Even if the state were to hold firm to its abolitionist agenda and refuse
to recognize coupledom except in terms of what individuals choose to
do, the result of abolition would be not one big new void in the legal
realm, but a proliferation of new, smaller state-sponsored rules, cov-
ering the terrain that the old marriage regime once regulated more
obliquely. The substantive content of these new state-sponsored con-
trols would not necessarily move private life in a progressive or be-
nevolent direction.
And if the state were to pull away from regulating the romantic
dyad altogether, allowing contracts and transactions to control this
kind of union, then social effects would follow. Although the aboli-
tionist stance consistently disclaims any agenda to abolish the couple
in any extralegal sense - two may merge into one in their own minds,
say abolitionists, even as they remain two in the eyes of the law - re-
formers know from experience that when American law stops recog-
nizing a particular status, that status goes into decline in day-to-day
life, not just in legal form. 52 As the concept of an e pluribus unum
couple gets weaker in relation to the state's abandonment of marital
status, intimate conjunction would move toward an exchange under-
taken in the hope of individual gain, like the purchase and sale of
goods in a market. We have seen that Regan thinks each player in this
game is a loser, at least in relation to the alternative available through
state-sponsored marriage. The societal perspective on this abolitionist
picture is less bleak, but concerns emerge.
351. For stimulating my thoughts on this subject, I thank Peter Siegelman, William
Eskridge, and Michael Broyde, each of whom separately volunteered his belief that any
abolition of state-sponsored marriage would install a range of new default settings, rather
than true elimination.
352. See supra Part III.C (discussing the relation between a legal category like marriage
and its "tertiary" effects, most of which are norms).
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There is no reason to suppose that the human craving for paired
connection would disappear with the abolition of state-sponsored mar-
riage, and so abolition would throw most people into an uncharted
competition for intimacy. The marital bond that now holds opposite-
sex couples together (and by example encourages same-sex couples to
think of themselves as conjoined) would loosen; pairing-off might
grow more provisional, requiring more effort to keep up. These strug-
gles would take time away from other pursuits. It seems plausible to
speculate that individuals who can never obtain respite from compet-
ing for intimacy would have less to offer (including, for example,
political engagement, the building of economic wealth, the care of
children, or expanding the frontiers of human knowledge and accom-
plishment) than those not competing in this market. To the extent that
individuals abjure the competitive market for romantic love and
choose isolation instead, civic realms could benefit from the energies
of full-time participants. But one might question the goodness of social
settings and institutions in which solitary, intimacy-barren volunteers
living in dissent from a common pursuit hold the reins. Moreover,
markets are notoriously severe, tending to reward powerful persons at
the expense of weaker ones. Wealth (in men) and reproductive-age
youth (in women) are cold commodities now; they might be pursued
and bought and sold and liquidated even more harshly in a world in
which men and women could not take refuge in status.
If these concerns about direct state regulation and a triumphant
market are valid - and their validity cannot be known, absent an
abolitionist experiment - then state-sponsored marriage becomes a
political force that, for all its numberless flaws, offers protections and
benefits. Located at a kind of midpoint between the intrusions of di-
rect regulation at one end and the laissez-faire prerogatives of the
market at the other, state-sponsored marriage presents a unique blend
of freedom and control. And just as the experience of getting married
connects couples with their past and their future, marriage as a social
institution manifests both continuity and change. Memories and arche-
types of marriage occupy human consciousness: when same-sex mar-
riage activists criticize Baker v. State, the Vermont decision that used a
common-benefits clause of the state constitution to extend the legal
privileges of marriage to same-sex couples,353 they mean to say, among
other things, that one of the "common benefits" withheld under
353. See, e.g., David B. Cruz, "Just Don't Call It Marriage": The First Amendment and
Marriage as an Expressive Resource, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 925, 1020 (2001) (contending that
Vermont's civil unions violate the First Amendment because they withhold expression from
citizens); Michael Mello, For Today, I'm Gay: The Unfinished Battle for Same-Sex Marriage
in Vermont, 25 VT. L. REV. 149, 156 (2000) (claiming that "political reality" stopped the
Vermont legislature from enacting same-sex marriage and that " 'political reality' is a polite
term for homophobia").
[Vol. 102:129
For and Against Marriage
Vermont law is a connection to symbols and traditions derived from
marriage in the past. State-sponsored marriage feels different from the
state-sponsored granting of marital entitlements:354 the force of mar-
riage lies in the fact that it combines legal privileges and duties with an
extralegal, socially understood set of conventions.
Political philosophy and legal theory recognize the force of extra-
legal authority on individuals' lives. Although the words "norms" and
"community" and "social meaning" and "anarchist philosophy" push
separate buttons and engage (or affront) different advocates, these
terms unite around their attention to intermediate institutions - buff-
ers between law and no-law - that structure human relations. Juris-
prudes of all schools acknowledge the existence of intermediate insti-
tutions as central to law in a complex society; there can be neither law
nor society without them. For the moment at least, marriage is a cru-
cial intermediate institution.
Readers thus far unconvinced that marriage is worth retaining
might now consider the procedural obstacles to abolition. Even if mar-
riage as 'third way,' to reuse a hoary phrase, were discounted, and the
market or direct state regulation preferred as a source of social con-
trol, the costs of abolishing state-sponsored marriage would be heavy,
in several senses. No groundswell of popular feeling supports this
change, and so marriage could be abolished only after considerable
investment - either in fending off resistance or the slower-paced
strategy of nurturing existing sentiments or tendencies against mar-
riage.356 This cost belongs on the ledger alongside our tripartite schema
of the disutilities of marriage.5
354. For this reason Mary Anne Case argues that women inclined to choose a male
rather than a female partner have a stake in debates over civil unions and domestic partner-
ship. They might abjure marriage because of its oppressive traditions, but also want the
"common benefits" of a state-sponsored pairing. Case, supra note 303. Case's stance com-
plements that of the same-sex marriage activists who oppose the Vermont compromise: both
she and they identify the symbolic community that links marriage to the past, but Case repu-
diates that link, whereas the activists pursue it. Although these stances may appear opposed,
one may readily agree with both of them. The connection of marriage to past traditions is a
source of social progress both for same-sex couples, who enrich the meaning of marriage,
and for heterosexual dissenters like Case, who testify to the danger of oppression while not
obstructing others from access to marriage.
355. Same-sex marriage may be necessary to build public recognition of lesbians and gay
men as partners in long-term relationships, not just as individuals. Christine Pierce, Gay
Marriage, J. SOC. PHIL., Fall 1995, at 5, 14 (1995). Without access to marriage, writes Pierce,
same-sex couples look abnormal, not like "couples, partners, family, and kin." Id. at 13.
356. See generally D.H. HODGSON, CONSEQUENCES OF UTILITARIANISM 110 (1967)
(arguing that the study of any reform proposal must take into account the conditions that the
reform proposes to change because, without this increment, one cannot know the price of
transition). I thank philosopher Ben Zipursky for helping me think of the much-stretched
"utilitarianism" as including the social costs of tampering with settled, relied-upon
marriage law.
357. See supra Part III.
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The transition between state recognition of marriage and no state
recognition of marriage yields numerous complications. Other legal
statuses, as was noted, have disappeared or dwindled in a variety of
patterns: the accretion of state-level reforms, judicial activism, presi-
dential decree, public disapproval and desuetude."' While most legal
statuses that have disappeared made their exit slowly, the abolition of
slavery provides an example of status elimination that the government
imposed on unwilling, bellicose Americans.
Advocates for the elimination of state-sponsored marriage can thus
consider the frontal-assault pattern that characterized the Civil War
and its aftermath, in addition to other precedents that got rid of
statuses in ambiguous retreats. The most dramatic mechanism would
be for Congress to declare every marriage null and void in the United
States.359 Congress may not have the power to pass such a law,36 even
if anyone would ever take such a violent prospect seriously as a plan of
action. As an alternative, imagine years of investigation followed by
enactment of a federal statute patterned on the Defense of Marriage
Act: pick a day in the future and circle it on the calendar as the last
date on which couples could enter into a marriage that the law would
recognize. Would thousands rush to the altar? How could more than
fifty jurisdictions, all of them with their own laws of marriage, coordi-
nate the timing of abolition?
The abolish-marriage literature is inclined to pass over problems of
form and procedure, which include the division between federal and
state regulatory authority to control marriage, the role of the judiciary
in managing the abolition of state-sponsored marriage, the possibility
of executive-branch nonacquiescence, and the validity of legal judg-
ments or entitlements that might arise based on a mistaken belief that
parties were married in a way that the law recognizes. One must ad-
vert briefly to these difficulties here, however, to raise just a sugges-
tion of how cumbersome it would be for the government to get out of
358. See supra note 17.
359. The postwar government of Italy took this step with respect to titles of nobility, by
popular vote. Sophie Arie, Exiled Royals Dip a Toe in Italy, GUARDIAN (London), Mar. 15,
2003, at 15.
360. See supra Part I.A (noting constitutional limitations). One might also note that the
Tenth Amendment, see New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 187-88 (1992) (invalidating
congressional legislation that infringed upon state sovereignty), and Article I limitations on
congressional power, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE
SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES 4 (2002) (noting that the Supreme Court has
held, in several unrelated areas of law, that Congress cannot pass laws impinging on state
sovereignty), and the narrowing view of the Commerce Clause that the Supreme Court took
in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-19 (2000), may prohibit Congress from invali-
dating all existing and future marriages. For an overview of these evolving limits on congres-
sional power, see Jesse H. Choper, Taming Congress's Power Under the Commerce Clause:
What Does the Near Future Portend?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 731 (2003).
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the marriage business. Moreover, even if we assume an orderly shift
from the current world into this future one, a large cohort would live
in the in-between years, with some people entitled to call themselves
"married" or needing to get "divorced" in order to "remarry," and
others disabled altogether from the status. Strife and frustration within
families, and among unrelated persons, would accompany the transi-
tion.
If, by contrast, state-sponsored marriage were to remain an option
while also receiving some of the critical attention that I have cast on it
here, society would more likely maximize its gains. The benefits of
marriage, whatever they really are, would continue. The detriments
would be better understood, perhaps becoming more amenable to
strategic minimization at the individual level (for example, couples
could anticipate future difficulties with antenuptial contracting) and
law reform at the aggregate (we could rewrite Social Security rules, for
instance). With marriage no longer fulsomely and tautologically
praised as the source of everything good but rather treated as a mixed
blessing, individuals would enter into this relation more soberly, and
society would regain some of the losses now written off under tenden-
tious bookkeeping. Kept alive and thus open to future gain, marriage
could evolve into something better.
CONCLUSION
In 1997, when activists were beginning to achieve their first legisla-
tive successes in promoting marriage, one dissenting activist added a
dash of rhetoric to the public mix:
An enterprise has a fifty percent failure rate. The female participants are
injured sixty-three percent of the time. Children in the system are physi-
cally and sexually abused from thirty to eighty percent of the time. If this
were a business, its doors would soon be closed. If it were a workplace,
OSHA would shut it down. If it were a school, the principal would be ar-
rested. Instead politicians extol it, courts ruminate over its value to soci-
ety, and business, religious, and cultural leaders pander to its mystique.36'
The passage is noteworthy not for its dubious statistics - the "failure
rate" of marriage is hard to measure; the thirty-to-eighty range is so
wide as to be meaningless; and the percentage of women "injured" by
marriage is probably not precisely sixty-three - but as a specimen of
the fervent discourse that altered American law at a particular time,
and has not yet finished its work.
361. Post, supra note 19, at 283. Post cites the Statistical Abstract of the United States:
1995, Post, supra note 19, at 283 nn.1-3 (citing U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 1995, at 346 tbl.87 (115th ed. 1995)), which, in my
opinion, does not support her claims.
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With the exception of specialists in family law and policy, few
commentators dwelled much on state-sponsored marriage until the
late 1990s, when the discussion grew too noisy to ignore. Federal wel-
fare reform enacted in 1996 attacked as pathological those families
made up of low-income, unmarried mothers and their children.362 The
federal Defense of Marriage Act and its isomorphs in the states ven-
tured for the first time into legal definitions of marriage. These proc-
lamations underscored marriage as Status, an institution that rests on
fixed and immutable ascribed characteristics.363 "Covenant marriage"
and related reforms began to make divorce harder to get.3" "Father-
hood initiatives" and other small-scale programs, first supported by
federal grant money out of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families
(the program that replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children)
and then by new appropriations, meddled overtly in private lives.365
Antidivorce state-government spending flourished in bastions of mari-
tal breakdown like Oklahoma and Arkansas.3" For their part, gay ac-
tivists took up same-sex marriage to the exclusion of older causes, such
as funding for the AIDS crisis and the expression of radical social cri-
tique.367 A well-funded movement soldiered in behalf of marriage, us-
ing surveys and other quasi-scientific means; one book, The Case for
Marriage, has told readers that if they get with the program they will
be healthy, wealthy, and wise.
In short, observers of contemporary American law and policy re-
form have now been provoked. The more activists "pander to its mys-
tique,"3" the more state-sponsored marriage invites a citizen to con-
sider a challenge: Why marriage?3 69 Who needs it? Not children and
their parents, with whom the state can deal separately. Not believers in
the sanctity of marital union: such persons remain free to perform
rituals celebrating the pair bond. Why shouldn't American law aban-
don the status of marriage - just as it has abandoned other notorious
comprehensive personal statuses related to race, gender, and mental
362. See supra Part II.B.3.
363. See supra text accompanying note 10.
364. See supra Part II.B.1.
365. See supra Part II.B. 3.
366. Zaslow, supra note 28 (recounting the failure of these expenditures).
367. See Martha M. Ertman, Reconstructing Marriage: An InterSEXional Approach, 75
DENV. U. L. REV. 1215, 1247-48 (1998) (noting "[qjueer [t]heory [q]ualms [a]bout [s]ame-
[s]ex [m]arriage" and identifying political issues that the same-sex marriage endeavor can
bury or overshadow). For an argument that activism on behalf of same-sex marriage is com-
patible with more radical agendas, see Barbara J. Cox, The Lesbian Wife: Same-Sex Marriage
as an Expression of Radical and Plural Democracy, 33 CAL. W. L. REV. 155 (1997).
368. Post, supra note 19, at 283.
369. Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 239 (2001).
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condition - and allow the ordinary law of torts, property, crimes, and
(especially) contracts to govern relations between adults?
The answer cannot be found in the familiar "case for marriage."
The marriage movement has installed marriage promotion as state and
federal policy, and may have led some couples or individuals toward
the license-and-ceremony route rather than a more casual affiliation
like cohabitation. But it has failed to justify the existence of state-
sponsored marriage. Taking as fixed and unquestioned the gross fa-
voritism that the government lavishes on marriage (in its current
opposite-sex, antipolygamous, officially sanctioned form), activists cite
the prosperity of married persons to justify this law-based favoritism
and argue for its extension. The project is propaganda, not reason or
social science. It is specious to applaud marriage as better than its ab-
sence on the ground that married people are happier or healthier or
richer or more fecund than unmarried people; these disparities in wel-
fare may derive from arbitrary laws that could be rewritten or re-
pealed. And even if marriage makes an individual better off, the socie-
tal stake in marriage requires a separate rationale, and on this point
marriage-movement partisans have not gone beyond vague plati-
tudes.37" To entrust the entire case for marriage to the marriage
movement risks missing better points, a deeper case.
Accordingly, this Article has put state-sponsored marriage to a
straightforward jurisprudential test. Referring to the writings of
Jeremy Bentham and Oliver Wendell Holmes on government power, I
have begun with the premise that any artifact of the law deserves to be
abolished if it does not promote human well-being. This starting point
fits the case for marriage into a study resembling cost-benefit analysis.
While the benefits and detriments of marriage cannot be measured
precisely, some counting is possible. After identifying the detriments
of state-sponsored marriage, which this Article has laid out in three
levels - "primary," through which the state forgoes or loses revenue
that it would otherwise have; "secondary," through which the state
contributes to a buildup of social losses; and "tertiary," through which
norms and social meanings leave people worse off - one may con-
sider its benefits.
370. See, e.g., supra note 112 (quoting a marriage-movement website); President Names
Senior Advisor, supra note 134. In fairness to the marriage movement, its spokespersons
may believe that this separate rationale is not necessary: if marriage is good for individuals,
then in the aggregate it is good for society, because society consists of individuals. See gener-
ally Josie Huang, Census: Maine Eighth in the U.S. in Percentage of Divorced Residents,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD, June 15, 2002, at 1A (quoting David Popenoe in order to con-
nect divorce with poverty and juvenile crime). Nevertheless, the omission is crucial. Indi-
viduals must choose between marrying or not marrying, to the extent they have a choice.
They cannot abolish marriage. Societies and systems, however, have the power to abandon
recognition of marriage as a legal status.
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Satisfactory arguments, it turns out, support state-sponsored mar-
riage as a comprehensive, capital-S personal Status, the legal artifice
that Henry Maine pronounced dead or dying in 1861. At an individual
level, marriage gives persons something valuable, enhancing the gains
they achieve when they venture toward intimacy with another person.
At a communal level, the space where law reform works, marriage is a
valuable locus of political and social power, a counterweight: without
marriage, the force that would expand to control citizens' private lives
is either the state or capital, an unrelenting press of the market. No
blithe, freeing, choice-affirming alternative to this extraordinary insti-
tution is available. Yet honest bookkeeping demands vigilance in aid
of repair. The endeavor to mend marriage - that is, to fulfill its
promises for the benefit of individuals and society, and to ameliorate
its lingering ills and injustices - begins with recognition of the good
that it achieves.
